Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong? by Black, Bernard et al.
Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went
Wrong?
By: Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman and Anna Tarassova
Working Paper Number 269a
May 2000
  
Russian Privatization and Corporate






 IRIS (Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector)
University of Maryland, College Park
forthcoming in 52 Stanford Law Review ___-___ (2000)
(this is an almost final version of the to-be-published article)
Stanford Law School
John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 178
William Davidson Institute at
University of Michigan Business School
Working Paper No. 269
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network electronic library at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=181348
Russian Privatization and Corporate




In Russia and elsewhere, proponents of rapid, mass privatization of state-
owned enterprises  (ourselves among them) hoped that the profit incentives
unleashed by privatization would soon revive faltering, centrally planned
economies.  The revival didn’t happen.  We offer here some partial
explanations. First, rapid mass privatization is likely to lead to massive self-
dealing by managers and controlling shareholders unless (implausibly in the
initial transition from central planning to markets) a country has a good
infrastructure for controlling self-dealing.  Russia accelerated the self-
dealing process by selling control of its largest enterprises cheaply to crooks,
who transferred their skimming talents to the enterprises they acquired, and
used their wealth to further corrupt the government and block reforms that
might constrain their actions.  Second, profit incentives to restructure
privatized businesses and create new ones can be swamped by the burden on
business imposed by a combination of (among other things) a punitive tax
system, official corruption, organized crime, and an unfriendly bureaucracy.
Third, while self-dealing will still occur (though perhaps to a lesser extent)
if state enterprises aren’t privatized, since self-dealing accompanies
privatization, it politically discredits privatization as a reform strategy and
can undercut longer-term reforms.  A principal lesson: developing the
institutions to control self-dealing is central to successful privatization of
large firms.
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1 The best statement of the optimists’ view is MAXIM BOYCKO, ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT
VISHNY, PRIVATIZING RUSSIA (1995).  Boycko was one of the principal Russian architects of mass
privatization.  Shleifer and Vishny are American economists who helped to design the Russian mass
privatization program.  They and their collaborators recruited us (Tarassova beginning in 1992, Black
and Kraakman beginning in 1993) to work on the legal infrastructure for Russia's capital markets.
One outgrowth of that effort was the current Russian law on joint stock companies, which we have
described elsewhere.  See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate
Law, 109 HARV. L.   REV. 1911 (1996); B E R N A R D  S .  B LACK , REINIER KRAAKMAN & ANNA
TARASSOVA, GUIDE TO THE RUSSIAN LAW ON JOINT STOCK COMPANIES (1998).
I.  INTRODUCTION
Rapid mass privatization of state-owned enterprises in formerly centrally
planned economies hasn’t turned out the way its creators hoped, in Russia or
elsewhere.  When Russian mass privatization began in the early 1990s, its
proponents (including ourselves) hoped that the Russian economy would soon
bottom out and then turn upward, as the efficiency incentives unleashed by
privatization took hold.1  That didn’t happen.
Russia's mass privatization "voucher auctions" were moderately honest, but
gave control to managers.  This permitted insiders (managers and controlling
shareholders) to engage in extensive self-dealing (transactions between insiders
and the company, in which the insiders profit at the company's expense), which
the government did nothing to control.  Later privatization “auctions” were a
giveaway of Russia’s most important companies at bargain prices to a few well-
connected “kleptocrats,” who got the funds to buy these companies by
skimming from the government and transferred their skimming talents to the
enterprises they acquired.
 At the macro level, the Russian economy stumbled along through mid-1998,
then collapsed again, as it had in 1991-92 prior to privatization. Russia’s
medium-term prospects are only so-so.  The Russian ruble has plunged; the
Russian government has defaulted on both its dollar- and ruble-denominated
debt, most banks are bankrupt, corruption is rampant, tax collection is abysmal,
capital flight is pervasive, and new investment is scarce.  The Russian economy
rebounded somewhat in 1999 and 2000, but from a greatly shrunken base and
mostly because oil prices soared.  The fundamentals of nonextractive industries
haven’t changed that much. It remains to be seen whether Russia’s new
President, Vladimir Putin, will develop a coherent economic  policy—none has
emerged in his first year as Prime Minister and then President.
Russia’s disappointment with mass privatization is mirrored in other former
Soviet Union countries and, less severely, in the Czech Republic, which at one
time seemed to be a model of the transition from central planning to a market
economy.  This suggests that the failure of privatization to jumpstart the Russian
4 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:XXX
2 Early doubters about rapid privatization include JANOS KORNAI, THE ROAD TO A FREE
ECONOMY: SHIFTING FROM A SOCIALIST SYSTEM—THE EXAMPLE OF HUNGARY  (1990); Stephen
S. Cohen & Andrew Schwartz, Privatization in the Former Soviet Empire: The Tunnel at the End of
the Light,  AMER .  P ROSPECT, Spr. 1993, at 99; Peter Murrell, What is Shock Therapy?  What Did
it Do in Poland and Russia?, 9 POST-SOVIET AFF. 111 (1993); Peter Murrell & Yijiang Wang,
When Privatization Should be Delayed: The Effect of Communist Legacies on Organizational and
Institutional Reforms, 17 J. COMP . ECON.  385 (1993).  Recent work includes GERARD ROLAND,
TRANSITION ECONOMICS: POLITICS, MARKE T S  A N D  F IRMS (forthcoming 2000); David Ellerman,
Voucher Privatization with Investment Funds: An Institutional Analysis (World Bank Pol’y Research
Paper No. 1924, 1998); Janos Kornai, Ten Years After “The Road to a Free Economy”: The Author’s
Self-Evaluation, working paper presented at the Annual Bank Conference on Development
Economics (World Bank 2000); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Whither Reform? Ten Years of the Transition,
working paper presented at the Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (World Bank
1999); John Nellis, Time to Rethink Privatization in Transition Economies?,  FIN. & DEV., June 1,
1999, at 16.  
3  Anna Tarassova was a senior legal advisor to the Russian Privatization Ministry during mass
privatization and later a senior legal advisor to the Russian Securities Commission.  She participated
in drafting many of the basic laws and Presidential  decrees that support Russia's capital markets.
Bernard Black and Anna Tarassova worked together on several Russian capital markets laws and
decrees, including joint stock company law, securities law, limited liability company law, and a decree
on investment funds; Reinier Kraakman assisted in developing the theoretical structure for the
Russian joint stock company law.  Black has also been an advisor on privatization, corporate
governance, and capital markets legislation in Armenia, the Czech Republic, Indonesia, Mongolia,
South Korea, Ukraine, and Vietnam; Kraakman has advised on company law in Vietnam; Tarassova
has advised on capital markets and commercial legislation in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Macedonia and Ukraine.
economy may reflect structural flaws in mass privatization as a transition
mechanism, not just Russia’s specific circumstances.
This paper joins an emerging literature that questions whether rapid mass
privatization of large firms is an important element of the transition from central
planning to a market economy.2  We develop below a case study of what went
wrong with large-firm privatization in Russia, using the Czech Republic as a
comparison case study to assess the extent to which Russia's problems are
generalizable.  We bring to this task a reasonable mix of insiders’ knowledge
and outsiders’ skepticism, gained through experience with privatization and
capital markets reform in Russia and other countries.3
We leave to others analysis of the macroeconomic  steps that Russia might
have taken and focus on microeconomic steps related to privatization and capital
markets development.  But the two are related.  Russia's macro effort to
balance the budget, control inflation, and attract investment was defeated, in
large measure, by the micro failures we discuss below.
We see three main failures in the Russian privatization effort.  First, rapid
mass  privatization of large enterprises is likely to lead to massive insider self-
dealing unless (implausibly in the initial transition from central planning to
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markets) a country has a good infrastructure for controlling self-dealing.  If
control is given to the current managers, as in Russian mass privatization, they
often won’t know how to run a company in a market economy.  Some
managers will loot their companies, perhaps killing an otherwise viable company.
If outsiders can acquire control in the stock market, as in the Czech Republic,
bad owners will often drive out good ones.  A controlling stake is worth more
to a dishonest owner who will extract all of a firm's value than to an honest
owner who will share that value with minority shareholders.
To prevent this outcome, development of a decent legal and enforcement
infrastructure must precede or at least accompany privatization of large firms.
If privatization comes first, massive theft is likely to occur before the
infrastructure to control it can develop.  At the same time, important parts of
this infrastructure require a base of existing private firms.  For example, to learn
to prosecute fraud and self-dealing, regulators need some fraud and self-dealing
to practice on.  Thus, privatization must to some extent be staged, lest the
crooks simply outrun the regulators.
In a mythical thick market for corporate control, good owners could buy
companies from bad owners if the company was worth more if run honestly
than if run to maximize short-run skimming.  But in fact, good owners don't exist
in Russia in significant numbers or with the capital to buy large enterprises.  If
they existed, they wouldn't pay a bad owner anything close to fair value,
because they couldn't verify what shape the business was in.  Moreover, the
business might be worth more to the bad owner, who has a comparative
advantage in the important tasks of self-dealing, evading taxes, obtaining favors
from the government, not paying workers, and using effective albeit unofficial
means (read: the Mafia) to enforce contracts and scare off competitors.  In
contrast, an honest owner risks having the government expropriate his
investment.
Second, the profit incentives to restructure privatized enterprises (instead
of looting them), and to create new businesses that could draw workers from
shrinking enterprises, can be swamped by a hostile business environment.  In
Russia, that environment included a punitive tax system, official corruption,
organized crime, an unfriendly bureaucracy, failure to privatize urban land, and
a business culture in which skirting the law is seen as normal, even necessary
behavior.  
Third, corrupt privatization of large firms can compromise future reforms.
In Russia, self-dealing was widespread before privatization began, and would
have continued if large enterprises were privatized more slowly.  But
privatization can make self-dealing easier.  In a vicious circle, dirty privatization
also reinforces corruption and organized crime, as the new owners (some
already with Mafia ties) turn their new wealth to the task of bribing judges and
6 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:XXX
4 We do not assess in this paper where the line should be drawn between small enterprises, for
which rapid privatization seems desirable, and large enterprises, for which it is problematic.
government officials.  Corrupt officials and company insiders join forces to
resist future reforms, while the public  comes to see privatization (and, by
inference, other market reforms) as connected with self-dealing, corruption, and
organized crime.
To be sure, Russia’s economic  problems weren’t caused by privatization.
Ukraine offers a sobering example.  It hasn’t privatized large firms, but is as
corrupt as Russia and has done even worse economically.  Comparing Russia
with Ukraine suggests that if government is bad enough—badly enough
corrupted, incapable of sustaining sensible policy—mass privatization won’t
affect economic  performance very much, for better or worse.  The assets of
state-owned enterprises will be stolen whether they are privatized or not.
Our concerns here are with rapid mass privatization of large enterprises, not
with the other elements of the "shock therapy" prescription dispensed by
Western advisors.  There is much to be said, in the transition to a market
economy, for the government rapidly selling or giving away small shops and
businesses to the people who work there, and apartments and land to the people
who live there.  These steps don't entail the separation of ownership and control
that encourage self-dealing by controllers of large enterprises.  But we believe
that a concerted effort to control self-dealing is central to successful large firm
privatization.4
An important piece of the overall puzzle: The largest Russian companies
were sold in massively corrupt fashion to a handful of well-connected men, soon
dubbed “kleptocrats” by the Russian press (Russian: 8:,BH@<">Z), who
made their first centimillions or billions through sweetheart deals with or outright
theft from the government, and then leveraged that wealth by buying major
companies from the government for astonishingly low prices.  The “reformers”
who promoted privatization regretted the corruption, but claimed that any private
owner was better than state ownership.  Even if the new owners got their
ownership in regrettable ways, they would have incentives to increase company
value.  Many foreign advisors bought this story, viewed dirty privatization as
better than no privatization, and supported Russia’s privatization czar, Anatoli
Chubais, as he pursued privatization by any available means.
Left unnoticed was that the new owners had two ways to make
money—increase the company’s value, or steal what value already existed.
The first was difficult, perhaps beyond their ability, and uncertain in outcome.
The second was easy; they were expert at it; and it was sure to produce a
handsome profit that could be tucked away overseas, beyond the reach of a
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5 This assumes that Yukos exported roughly 25% of its production, at world prices of around
$18/barrel, and sold the balance at domestic prices of around $10.50/barrel.  Yukos revenue is based
on translated Yukos financial statements provided to us by Graham Houston of National Economic
Research Associates.  Houston's numbers are also reported in Jeanne Whalen, Shareholders Rights:
Round 2, MOSCOW T IMES, Feb. 17, 1998.
6 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss which institutions were most important.  That
topic is addressed in Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L.  REV. (forthcoming 2000) ,  available in Social Science Research Network at
<http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=182169>.
future Russian government.  Most of the kleptocrats chose the second, easy
approach.
An example: Bank Menatep (controlled by kleptocrat Mikhail
Khodorkovski) acquired Yukos, a major Russian oil holding company, in 1995.
For 1996, Yukos’ financial statements show revenue of $8.60 per barrel of
oil—about $4 per barrel less than it should have been. 5  Most of the missing
revenue likely ended up in offshore bank accounts controlled by Mr.
Khodorkovski and his accomplices.  Khodorkovski skimmed over 30 cents per
dollar of revenue while stiffing his workers on wages, defaulting on tax
payments, destroying the value of minority shares in Yukos and its production
subsidiaries, and not reinvesting in Yukos' oil fields.
It’s doubtful that running Yukos honestly could have earned Khodorkovski
a fraction of what he earned by skimming revenue, let alone offshore and tax-
free.  He made a rational, privately value-maximizing choice.  Even if running
Yukos honestly was the best long-run strategy, Khodorkovski might have
preferred present profit over future uncertainty.  Besides, skimming was a
business that he knew, while oil production was a tough business that he might
fail in.
This example illustrates a general point: Privatization is not enough.  It
matters who the owners are, what constraints on self-dealing they face, and the
business climate they operate in.  If it isn’t politically feasible to import foreign
owners, who are more likely to run privatized businesses honestly (though
foreign owners must be watched too, as the Czechs learned) and to invest if
profit opportunities exist, the government’s second-best choice may be to first
privatize selected firms with strong profits and reputedly honest managers, and
watch these firms carefully once they are privatized, while building the legal and
market institutions to control self-dealing.6
Even without immediate privatization, managers can be motivated to
restructure by the promise of running a company that will be privatized if
profitable.  The government’s ability to control theft will be higher if the
enterprise is still state-owned.  And the enterprise’s sale price will be far higher
8 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:XXX
7 For a case study that attributes Poland’s economic success partly to strong capital markets
regulation, see Simon Johnson & Andrei Shleifer, Coase v. the Coasians (working paper 1999),
available in Social Science Research Network at <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=193776>.
if it is sold in a stronger legal environment, in a fairer auction, and perhaps with
more foreign participation than was politically acceptable in the near term.
Ironically, Russia had such a "staged privatization" program in place in the early
1990s, through a program called enterprise leasing.  The privatizers killed
enterprise leasing because they thought it wasn't fast enough.
Proponents of fast privatization may respond that there is no assurance that
the infrastructure to control self-dealing will develop anytime soon.  This is
indeed a risk.  But the right response may be to stage privatization and work
hard to develop this infrastructure, rather than privatize large firms anyway and
hope that the outcome will somehow be acceptable.
Several countries on the fringes of the former Soviet Union created a
reasonably friendly climate for new businesses and achieved corresponding
economic  success—including Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, and
the Czech Republic  (which may have done reasonably well despite, rather than
because of, mass privatization).  Poland offers a nice contrast to Russia.  It was
slow to privatize its major businesses or its banks.  It succeeded economically
because it quickly privatized small businesses, created a climate in which new
businesses could thrive, and built strong capital markets regulation that largely
preceded large-firm privatization.7
This article proceeds as follows.  Part II surveys Russian privatization and
the sometimes astonishing corruption that accompanied the privatization effort.
Part III discusses the factors that affect how much self-dealing the controllers
of privatized enterprises will engage in, the structural flaws in Russia’s
privatization efforts, and the often unhappy outcomes from privatization.  Part
IV addresses the counterfactual question of what might have happened with
staged privatization and greater effort to build institutions to control self-dealing.
Part V evaluates Czech mass privatization, to assess the extent to which
Russia’s experience was rooted in large-firm privatization without controls on
self-dealing, and to what extent that experience reflects Russia’s unique
problems.  Part VI offers some suggestions for future privatization efforts and
future aid to Russia.  Part VII concludes.
We seek to understand what went wrong with a plausible reform program,
what reforms might have worked better, and what can be done now.  We part
company with critics of mass privatization who espouse implausible alternatives,
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8 For an industrial  policy proposal, see  ALICE H.  AMSDEN, JACEK KOCHANOWICZ & LANCE
T A Y L O R,  T H E  MA R K E T  MEETS ITS MATCH: RESTRUCTURING THE ECONOMIES OF EASTERN
EUROPE (1994).  For a blaming effort, see JANINE R. WEDEL, COLLISION AND COLLUSION: THE
STRANGE CASE OF WESTERN AID TO EASTERN EUROPE, 1989-1998 (1998). 
such as Asian-style industrial policy (which Russia was incapable of carrying
out), or seem mostly interested in assigning blame.8
II.  A CYNIC’S TOUR OF RUSSIAN PRIVATIZATION
This Part surveys Russia’s privatization history.  Some of the stories that we
report are well-known; others are newly reported here.  Taken together, they
paint a grim picture of a government that privatized small, mid-sized, and many
large companies in semi-honest fashion through mass privatization, but tolerated
virtual giveaways of majority stakes in the largest companies, where most of the
value lay, as well as insiders' theft of the value of minority shares in most large
companies.
A warning.  The misdeeds that we report don't lend themselves to easy
fact-checking.  For some, we have personal knowledge; this is indicated in
footnotes.  For the others, we rely on news stories and sometimes, even less
satisfactorily, on "general knowledge"—for example, the general belief that
Gazprom CEO Rem Vyakhirev owns a substantial percentage of Gazprom's
shares.  Thus, we may inadvertently tell a story that isn't true or, more likely,
provides a partial picture.  Still, we believe that our overall depiction of Russian
business practices is accurate.  The problem in recounting misdeeds by Russian
insiders isn't finding true stories, but picking among the juicy stories that abound.
A.  Mass Privatization: 1992-1994
Russia in 1992 was a huge country with a weak central government, that
had neither will nor capacity to force privatization onto unwilling company
managers.  The prevailing Western advice called for “shock therapy”—rapid
decontrol of prices, freeing of markets, and privatization of industry.  Speed was
thought critical, both to revive the economy and to reduce the state's role in the
economy before popular tolerance for the dislocations that accompanied the
shock was exhausted and reform lost its political momentum.  As shock
therapist Jeffrey Sachs wrote:
The need to accelerate privatization is  the paramount economic  policy issue
facing Eastern  Europe.  If there is no breakthrough in the privatization of large
10 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:XXX
9 Jeffrey Sachs, Accelerating Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, 1 NEW EUR.
L.  REV. 71, 71 (1992); see also JEFFREY SACHS, POLAND’S JUMP TO THE MA R K E T  ECONOMY
(1993).  For other statements of the prevailing Western wisdom, see ANDERS ASLUND, HOW
R USSIA B E C A M E  A  MA RKET ECONOMY (1995); JOSEPH R. BLASI ,  MA Y A  KR O U M O V A  &
DO U G L A S  KRUSE, KREMLIN CAPITALISM: P R I V A T I Z I N G  T H E  R U S S I A N  EC O N O M Y  (1997);
BOYCKO, SHLEIFER & VISHNY (1995), supra note 1.  For an argument that Poland's economic
success came from building on existing institutions, not the shock of discarding them,  see  GRZEGORZ
W. KOLODKO, FRO M  S H O C K  T O  T H E R A P Y :  T H E  P O L I T I C A L  ECONOMY OF POSTSOCIALIST
TRANSFORMATION (2000). 
1 0  See ,  e .g ., Steven L. Jones, William L. Megginson, Robert C. Nash & Jeffry M. Netter, Share
Issue Privatizations as Financial Means to Political and Economic Ends, 53 J.  FIN. ECON. 217
(1999).
11 See BOYCKO, SHLEIFER & VISHNY (1995), supra  note 3, at 71-72; Maxim Boycko, Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Voucher Privatiza t ion ,  35  J .  FIN. ECON. 249 (1994).  In hindsight,
some of the arguments against mass cash auctions seem thin.  Foreign participation in cash auctions
could have been limited, as it was for voucher auctions.  Ill-gotten wealth could be used to buy
vouchers (Russian vouchers were tradeable) as easily as to buy companies in cash auctions.  And
Russians were not that poor.  They had over $100 billion in the state savings bank, at least before
the government froze savings accounts and then destroyed their value through inflation.  
enterprises in  the near future, the entire process could be stalled for years to
come.  Privatization is urgent and politically vulnerable.9
Privatization of state-owned enterprises in developed countries and some
transition countries has proceeded primarily through one-company-at-a-time
auctions, generally with reasonable transparency. 10  But countries attempting
the transition from centrally-planned to market economies had thousands of
state-owned enterprises to dispose of, many of modest size, only some of which
were viable.  One-at-a-time cash auctions couldn’t meet the shock therapists’
timetable, and involved large transaction costs relative to enterprise value.
Mass cash auctions were thought likely to exhaust the citizenry’s funds and to
risk political backlash if companies were sold to wealthy crooks, ex-government
officials, or foreigners.11
Mass privatization became the favored alternative.  Citizens would be given
vouchers, which they could use to buy shares of privatized companies.  The
Czech Republic  showed the way.  Czech voucher privatization began in 1991,
was well underway in 1992 when Russia started down the same road, and was
largely complete by 1994.  Czech industry was in private hands, and a new
investment fund industry had sprung up to collect vouchers from citizens and
invest in privatized firms.  These “voucher investment funds” promised
diversification, plus strong outside owners who could replace managers who
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12 We discuss the Czech Republic's experience with mass privatization in Part V infra.  Our
discussion of Russian privatization relies primarily on B LASI ,  KROUMOVA & KRUSE (1997), supra
note 9: BOYCKO, SHLEIFER & VISHNY (1995), supra note 1; and the personal knowledge of Black
and Tarassova.
13 See BLASI , KROUMOVA & KRUSE (1997), supra note 9, at 193 (management ownership
rose, on average, from 7% in 1994 to 10% in 1996, with the general director's stake rising from 2%
to 4.5%).
couldn’t make the transition to a market economy.  And the wealth giveaway
from voucher auctions made them initially popular.12
Russia followed in the Czech Republic’s footsteps, with some important
differences.  In the Czech Republic, most of a company’s shares were
distributed in voucher auctions; only a limited number of shares were reserved
for managers and employees.  A small number of voucher investment funds
accumulated most of the vouchers and bought large stakes in most major firms.
This gave most Czech firms major outside owners.
In Russia, there was neither political will nor administrative capacity to
force privatization on unwilling managers.  The political solution was to bribe
them with cheap shares so they would pursue privatization voluntarily.
Employees were also given large numbers of cheap shares, in a political bow
to the Communist ideology of worker ownership of the means of production.
The result: most privatized firms were initially majority owned by workers and
managers.  A typical outcome was 60-65% manager and employee ownership,
perhaps 20% ownership by individuals and voucher investment funds, with 15-
20% still held by the state, which planned to sell its remaining shares for cash
in the future.  Given Russian workers’ passivity and ignorance of free markets,
this ownership structure led to manager control of most enterprises.
Russian managers’ personal stake in their companies was often modest to
begin with, but rose quickly.  In Russia, vouchers were tradeable.  This let
managers buy vouchers that they could trade for shares in their own companies.
Managers often got the funds to buy vouchers by illegally “privatizing” company
funds.  They continued to accumulate shares after the voucher auctions were
completed, by convincing or coercing employees to sell their shares cheaply.13
Some auctions were marked by other irregularities.  Under the auction
design, if fewer vouchers were bid for a company's shares, more shares would
be distributed per voucher. This gave insiders an incentive to discourage others
from bidding.  There were various ways to achieve this result.  The auction
location could be hard to reach (Russia is a large country with limited
transportation), or could be announced or changed at the last minute.  In some
cases, phone calls and air flights into the city where the auction took place were
conveniently disrupted shortly before the auction, or armed guards excluded
12 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:XXX
14 See Lucian Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership,
and Dual Class Equity: The Creation and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash Flow Rights
(Olin Ctr.  for Law, Econ., and Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Working Paper No. 249, 1998) ,  available in
Social Science Research Network at <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=147590>.
unwanted bidders from the auction.  The more valuable the company, the more
likely its managers (or well-connected outside investors) were to use tactics like
these.  And perhaps 1000 of the 15,000 mass-privatized firms cut special deals
with the government.
Finally, the largest enterprises were held out of voucher privatization, with
the government distributing at most a minority stake.  In several important
industries, the government created pyramid structures, bundling controlling
stakes in a number of operating companies into a few holding companies and
later sold controlling stakes in the holding companies.  The government created
seven oil holding companies: LUKOil, Sidanko, Sibneft, Rosneft, Tyumen Oil,
Yukos, and VNK.  Electric power (with United Energy Systems as the principal
holding company) and telecoms (with Svyazinvest as the principal holding
company) followed a similar pattern. 
Pyramid structures everywhere are an invitation for controlling shareholders
to siphon wealth from companies that they control, but have a limited economic
stake in.14  This risk is imperfectly controlled in other countries because the
pyramid commonly begins as a wholly-owned corporate group.  The controlling
family must develop a reputation for honesty, or no one will buy the
noncontrolling shares that it wants to sell.  The risk from pyramid structures was
magnified in Russia by weak enforcement, plus controllers’ ability to acquire
control of a pyramid without first developing a reputation for honesty. 
The privatizers knew that the auctions wouldn’t be perfectly clean, and that
manager/worker control of privatized companies would limit shareholder
oversight of managers.  They saw this as an acceptable political price to pay for
rapid privatization.  Even bad private owners were far better than state
ownership.  As Andrei Shleifer, a principal Western advisor to the Russian
privatizers, and Dmitri Vasiliev, a top Russian privatizer, explained:
[Russian ownership] structures have been to a large extent determined by the
political imperative of accommodating managerial preferences in the
privatization program, since without manager support firms would have
remained under political control.  We believe that the ownership structures
emerging from Russian privatization, while far superior to state ownership, still
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15 Andrei Shleifer & Dmitry Vasiliev, Management Ownership and Russian Privatization, in 2
CORPORATE GOVERNANC E  I N  C E N T R A L  EUROPE AND RUSSIA: INSIDERS AND THE STATE 62,
76-77 (Roman Frydman, Cheryl W. Gray & Andrzej Rapaczynski eds.,  1996); see also Nellis (1999),
supra note 2, at 18 (For the IMF and the World Bank, "[t]he immediate need was to create a basic
constituency of property owners: to build capitalism, one needed capitalists— lots of them, and
fast.").
16 See Matt Bivens & Jonas Bernstein, The Russia You Never Met (informally circulated English
version; Russian version was published in DEMOKRATIZATZIYA (1999)) (on file with authors,
available without footnotes at <//http://www.wayan. net/journal/russia/feb_22.htm>);  Russian Finance:
Byzantium, Inc. , ECONOMIST , July 19, 1997, at 62.
give managers  too much control relative to what is needed to speed up
efficient restructuring . . . . 15
The privatizers ignored the special risks created by pyramid structures.  We
recall no discussion of this issue at the time, and it isn’t mentioned in
contemporaneous literature.
For our part, we don’t doubt that privatization gave managers incentives to
make profits.  The harder question, to which we return in Part III, was how
many managers would seek to profit by improving their business, versus how
many would steal the value that the business still had.
B.  “Loans-for-Shares” and Other Rigged Auctions: 1995-Present
A story.  The U.S. Government owes $25 billion to Germany.  To pay off
the obligation, it gives $25 billion to Bank of America with instructions to wire
the funds to the German government.  The money never arrives.  No one ever
finds out where it went, or really tries to find out.  No one at Bank of America
goes to jail.  The government never asks Bank of America to pay the money
back, and the government continues to do business with Bank of America.
Indeed, the President invites Bank of America’s CEO to become a cabinet
secretary, in charge of economic reform.  For a time he agrees, before deciding
that there is more profit to be made by dealing with the government than by
helping to run it.
This story isn’t remotely possible in the United States. But change the bank
to Oneksimbank (owned by kleptocrat Vladimir Potanin), run the money not
through Oneksimbank itself but through two affiliated banks, and reduce the
amount to $502 million, which is a rough Russian equivalent of $25 billion as a
proportion of GNP, and it becomes a true Russian story, less widely known than
it ought to be.16  It’s no longer hard to understand how Oneksimbank
accumulated enough money to become a principal proponent and beneficiary of
the rigged “loans-for-shares” auctions of major companies, through which
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17 For a more recent example, see Funds Sent to Kemerovo Missing? RADIO FREE
EUROPE/RADIO L I B E R T Y  NE W S L I N E , May 21, 1999 <http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1999/05/1-
rus/rus-210599.html> ($100 million foreign loan, intended for the coal industry in Kemerovo Oblast,
never arrived at its destination) (<http://www.rferl.org/newsline/1999/05/210599.htm>).  On general
Kremlin corruption, see Celestine Bohlen,  Russian Says He Has Proof Bribes Were Paid to Kremlin,
N.Y.  T IMES, Aug. 31, 1999, at A8; Celestine Bohlen & Michael R. Gordon, Lawmakers Turn Back
Another Attempt by Yeltsin to Dismiss His Chief Prosecutor, N.Y.  T IMES, Oct. 14, 1999, at A6;
Geoffrey York, Kremlin Kills Corruption Probe of Highly Placed Officials, GLOBE & MAIL
(TORONTO), June 26, 1999, at A16.
18 On Gusinski and Potanin, see Bivens & Bernstein (1999), supra note 16. On Fridman, see
Craig Mellow, The Oligarch Who Knew Better ,  INST. INVESTOR, June 1999, at 95.  On
Khodorkovski, see The Abuses of “Authorized Banking,” RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO L I B E R T Y
(Jan. 1998) <http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/rufinance/authorize.html>.
1 9  Igor Baranovsky, Terror is a Fact of Russian Competition, MOSCOW NEWS, July 22, 1994,
at 22 (quoting Mr. Aven).
Russia sold its largest companies for a small fraction of fair value, beginning in
1995.  The same deep corruption that let Potanin walk off with half-a-billion
dollars can explain why the Russian government tolerated the obvious rigging
of the loans-for-shares auctions, even though it was desperate for the revenue
that honest auctions might have produced.17
Another popular way to instant wealth: Arrange to manage government
funds, which involved paying little or no interest to the government while
reinvesting the funds at market rates during a high-inflation period when interest
rates were in triple or high-double digits.  Vladimir Gusinski’s MOST Bank got
its start managing money in this manner for the Moscow city government;
Potanin’s Oneksimbank managed money for the Finance Ministry and the
Foreign Trade Ministry; Mikhail Fridman's's Alfa Bank managed funds for the
Customs Service and distributed agricultural subsidies.  Khodorkovski’s Bank
Menatep handled the funds that Russia spent on its 1996 military operations in
Chechnya and later promised to spend on rebuilding Chechnya.  A Russian
government audit later estimated that some $4.4 billion of these funds never
arrived at their intended destination.18  As Pyotr Aven, then head of Alfa Bank
(controlled by kleptocrat Mikhail Fridman), candidly explained:
To become  a millionaire in our country  it is  not at all necessary  to have a
good head and specialized knowledge.  Often it is enough to have active
support  in the government, the parliament, local power structures  and law
enforcement agencies.  One fine day your insignificant bank is authorized, for
instance, to conduct operation s  with budgetary  funds.  Or quotas are
generously allotted . . . for the export of oil, timber, and gas.  In other words,
you are appointed a millionaire . . . .19
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Transactions in Russia, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L.  & ECON. 737 (1996), and the personal
knowledge of Black and Tarassova.
Loans-for-shares was an audacious scheme to leverage wealth acquired in
these dubious ways, by using it to acquire Russia’s biggest companies for a
small fraction of their value.20  It began in 1995 with a proposal by Potanin,
backed by most of the major new Russian banks.  The Russian Government
wanted to raise revenue but found it politically hard to sell its stakes in these
enterprises, which had been excluded from voucher privatization.  The banks
proposed to loan funds to the government for several years, with repayment
secured by the government’s controlling stakes in these enterprises.  Everyone
understood that the Government would not repay the loans, and would instead
forfeit its shares to the banks that made the loans.
Under loans-for-shares, the Government auctioned its shares in a number
of major oil, metals, and telephone companies, with accompanying voting rights,
as security for loans, giving the shares to whomever would loan it the most
money.  But the auctions were peculiar indeed.  The right to manage the
auctions was parceled out among the major banks, who contrived to win the
auctions that they managed at astonishingly low prices.  The bid rigging that was
implicit in divvying up the auction-managing role became explicit in the actual
bidding.  The auction manager participated in two separate consortia (to meet
the formal requirement for at least two bids), each of whom bid the
government’s reservation price or trivially above that.  No one else bid at all.
Foreigners were either excluded formally or understood that it was pointless to
try to bid.
In the couple of cases when someone bid for a company intended to be won
by someone else, pretexts were found to disqualify the high bidder.  For
example, Oneksimbank managed the Norilsk Nickel auction, with a reservation
price of $170 million.  It arranged three bids from affiliates, all at $170 or $170.1
million. Unexpectedly, Rossiiski Kredit Bank offered $355 million, over twice
as much.  Oneksimbank disqualified Rossiiski Kredit’s bid on the grounds that
the bid amount exceeded Rossiiski Kredit’s charter capital (the nominal value
of its outstanding shares); Oneksimbank’s affiliate won the bidding at $170.1
million.  No matter that Oneksimbank’s winning bid suffered from the same
defect, nor that Rossiiski Kredit’s charter capital didn’t affect its ability to pay
the bid amount, nor that the auction rules required Oneksimbank to provide any
objections in advance of the auction, to give bidders time to cure them.  Not that
either bid reflected the value of Norilsk Nickel, which had annual profits of
around $400 million.
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21 Our discussion of Erdenet and Zarubezhtsvetmet is based on conversations between1996 and
1998 between Bernard Black and Z. Enkhbold, Head of the State Property Committee of Mongolia,
and on the Erdenet joint venture agreement, E@(:"T,>4, <,0*J BD"&4H,:\FH&@<
<@>(@:\F8@6 >"D@*>@6 D,FBJ$:484 4 BD"&4H,:\FH&@< F@`2" F@&,HF84N
F@P4":4FH4R,F84N D,FBJ$:48 @ *,bH,:\>@FH4 <@>(@:@-F@&,HF8@(@ F@&<,FH>@(@
(@D>@-@$@("HJH,:\>@(@ BD,*BD4bH4b “]C)]=]G” [Agreement Between the
Government of the Mongolian Peoples’  Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Activity of the Mongol-Soviet Joint Mining-Concentrating Enterprise
“ERDENET”] (June 5, 1991) (on file with authors).
22 3F8@&@, 2"b&:,>4, @ BD42>">44 >,*,6FH&4H,:\>Z< B:">"
BD4&"H42"P44 %? 1"DJ$,0P&,H<,H [Court complaint on deeming invalid the privatization
plan for VO Zarubezhtsvetmet],  filed by the General Prosecutor in the Moscow Arbitration Court
(May 6, 1997) (on file with authors).
23 Letter from Yuri Maslyukov, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, to Prime
Minister Elbegdorj of Mongolia (Oct. 29, 1998) (on file with authors).
The loans-for-shares auctions were auctions that the world was watching.
Hopes that visibility, plus the government’s desperate need for revenue, would
instill some semblance of honesty, were disappointed.  Meanwhile, auctions that
the world wasn’t watching were often even worse.  For example, Russian
formed Zarubezhtsvetmet (in Russian, this means “foreign nonferrous metals”)
to hold its 49% stake in a joint venture with the Mongolian government, which
ran Mongolia’s Erdenet copper mine.  Zarubezhtsvetmet's market value was
perhaps $250 million.  It was sold for $150,000 to insiders with connections to
the Russian Metallurgy Ministry.  No matter that Mongolia had the right to
approve any transfer of Russia’s interest in Erdenet, and a right of first refusal
to buy Russia’s stake at the price at which it was offered to someone else.
That right was ignored, despite Mongolia’s official government complaint.21 
Rather more of a nuisance was the Russian prosecutor who sued in 1997
to reverse the privatization of Zarubezhtsvetmet, on the grounds that Mongolia
hadn’t consented to Russia’s transfer of its interest in Erdenet.22  The
prosecutor’s error was soon corrected, and the suit has proceeded no further.
A second official complaint by Mongolia in 1998 received a blunt response:
QH@ 8"F",HF" %"T,&@ &@BD@F" @ D@FF46F8@< JR"FH>48,, H@
B@*H&,D0*",< ,  RH@ &  F@@H&,HFH&44  F  JB@<b>JHZ<
<,0BD"&4H,:\FH&,>>Z< E@(:"T,>4,< 4< b&:b,HFb @H8DZH@,
"8P4@>,D>@, @$V,FH&@ “%>,T>,^8@>@<4R,F8@, @$X,*4>,>4,
1"DJ$,0P&,H<,H”.  [With regard to your question about the Russian
participant [in Erdenet], this is to verify that in accordance with the [Russian-
Mongolian agreement on creation of Erdenet], it is Zarubezhtsvetmet.]23
The fix was still in.
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of the Russian Federation No. 1535 of July 22, 1994 (LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFlaw File).
25 See Regulations for the Procedure of Concluding an Agreement for Acquiring Shares with the
Group of an Enterprise's Workers Who Have Undertaken to Implement the Privatizat ion Plan and
to Prevent the Bankruptcy of the Enterprise to be Privatized, approved by Order of the State
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(LEXIS, Intlaw Library, RFlaw File).
26 See Matt Bivens, Cyprus Company Buys LUKOil Share, MOSCOW T IMES, Oct. 30, 1999.
Another common tactic: Beginning in 1994, the government often required
bidders in privatization auctions to promise specified future investments in the
enterprise.24  Once the winning bidder acquired the shares, the promised
investments were often quietly shelved, or the shares were transferred to
supposedly good faith purchasers, who weren’t bound by the investment
promise.  An honest purchaser couldn't use these dodges, so dishonest
purchasers tended to win the auctions.
Another privatization rule gave a firm's managers the right to acquire 30%
of its shares cheaply if they first secured an agreement with the employees that
would prevent the enterprise from going bankrupt for one year.  Since proof that
the enterprise would go bankrupt without the agreement, or wouldn't go
bankrupt for a year with it, was in the eye of the beholder, this was an all-but-
open gift of a controlling stake to the managers, in return for a phony agreement
with the employees.25
The rigged auctions still continue.  For example, in late 1999, an unknown
offshore company, presumably controlled by LUKOil’s managers, bought 9%
of its shares from the government for $3 per share when the market price was
$8, marking the third time in five years that LUKOil management had bought
a block of LUKOil shares from the government for less than the market price.26
C.  The Outcome: A Kleptocracy
Taken as a whole, Russian privatization led to several distinct outcomes.
First, a kleptocracy emerged.  A small number of individuals, who mostly
achieved initial wealth through favorable deals with or outright theft from the
government, ended up controlling most of Russia’s major firms and, to a
nontrivial extent, the government itself.  Second, as we discuss in Part IV, mass
privatization hasn’t measurably improved firm productivity.  
Third, the Russian public  came to associate privatization with corruption,
increased crime, and fabulous wealth for a chosen few while workers and
pensioners go unpaid.  By 1992, Russia had a new slang term for privatization
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27 Stiglitz (1999), supra note 2, also notes the chilling effect that dirty privatization had on
other market reforms.  On the possibility that a rule, although efficient in the near term, may be
inefficient in the long run because it produces political  backlash, see Mark J. Roe, Backlash ,  98
COLUM. L.  REV. 217 (1998).
28 See, e.g., Laura Belin, A Year of Discord, in ANNUAL SURVEY OF EASTERN EUROPE AND
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION:  1997—THE CHALLENGE OF INTEGRATION, at 276 (Peter Rutland
ed. 1998); Laura Belin, Changes in Editorial Policy and Ownership at Izvestiya,  in  i d .  at 291;
Floriana Fossato & Anna Kachkaeva, Russian Media Empires III, RADIO FREE EUROPE/ R A D I O
LIBERTY (May 26, 1998) <http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/rumedia3/index.html>.
29 Sources for Table I include many of the articles cited above, personal knowledge, a chart made
public by the U.S. State Department section on Intelligence and Review, Russia's Business Magnates:
Their Empires and Interrelationships (July 1998), Juliet  Johnson, Russia’s EmergingFinancial-
Industrial Groups, 13 POST-SOVIET AFF. 333 (1997), Donald N. Jensen,  Russia's Financial Empires ,
R A D I O  F R E E  E U R O P E / R A D I O  L I B E R T Y  ( J a n .  1 9 9 8 )
<http://www.rferl.org/nca/special/rufinance/index.html>, and Kirsten Vance, FIGs Rx Figures , RUSSIA
REV., July 31, 1998, at 24.  We used our best judgment in resolving conflicts between sources about
who owns what.  On the LUKOil-Luzhkov connection, see “Party of Exporters” to be Victor in
U p c o m i n g  P a r l i a m e n t a r y  E l e c t i o n s ,  R U S S I A  J . ,  M a y  2 4 - 3 0 ,  1 9 9 9 ,
<http://www.russiajournal.com/start/opinion/article_17_450.htm>.  On Gazprom, Chernomyrdin, and
Vyakhirev, see, e.g., Aleksandras Budrys, Ex-Russia PM Chernomyrdin returns to Gazprom,
REUTERS, June 30,1999;  Gazprom and Regions Cozy Up, RUSSIA J., May 24-30, 1999,
<http://www.russiajournal.com/start/business/article_17_466.htm>; John Lloyd, The Russian
Devolution, N.Y.  T IMES, Aug. 15, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 34, 51 (discussing Chernomyrdin's
that combined the word for privatization (Russian: BD4&"H42"P4b
(privatizatziya)) with the verb BD4N&"H4H\ (to grab, to take improperly) to
form BD4N&"H42"P4b (prikhvatizatziya), roughly translated as "grab-
privatization."  Top privatizer Anatoli Chubais was known as the (:"&>Z6
BD4N&"H42"H@D (glavni prikhvatizator; the chief grab-privatizer).  Popular
disgust with privatization strengthened the Communists and other anti-reform
political parties.27
As the kleptocrats' power grew, many bought TV stations, newspapers, and
other media outlets to promote the election of friendly politicians and blunt public
criticism of their activities.  They now control most major Russian newspapers
and TV stations.  To follow a political debate in the Russian press, or a turf
battle within the government, one must understand which kleptocrat owns which
newspaper, and which kleptocrat is allied with which politician.28
Table I lists those most often named as among the kleptocrats, and their
principal investments, government connections, and media outlets.  Other recent
or current major players include Roman Abramovich (Berezovski’s apparent
partner; Chairman of Sibneft); Vladimir Bogdanov (Surgutneftegaz); the
Chernoy brothers (aluminum companies); Anatoli Chubais (former Prime
Minister; head of the UES electric power company); and Vladimir Vinogradov
(Inkombank).29
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reputed ownership of Gazprom shares).  There may be an ongoing power struggle between
Chernomyrdin (appointed as Gazprom’s Chairman in 1999) and Vyakhirev (Chief Executive Officer)
for control of Gazprom.  On Berezovski's media interests, see Get Gusinsky, ECONOMIST , Nov. 20,
1999, at 58; Andrew Higgins, Russian Newspaper Finds Itself in a Tug of War Over Ownership,  WALL
ST. J., Aug. 9, 1999, at A15.  On Luzhkov, see Paul Klebnikov, Who Will be the Next Ruler of Russia?
The Slick City Boss or the Rough-Edged Populist General, FORBES, Nov. 16, 1998, at 152; Mark
Whitehouse, Moscow Mayor Steals Political Spotlight, WALL ST. J., May 20, 1999, at A14.
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or mostly a front man for Boris Berezovski, who rarely owns anything in his own name.  Conversely,
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See Eduard Gismatullin, Sibneft Director Steps onto Kremlin Stage, MOSCOW T IMES, June 1, 1999
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III.  STRUCTURAL FLAWS IN RUSSIAN PRIVATIZATION
Russian privatization was dirty.  On the whole, the bigger the stakes, the
dirtier the deal.  Its advocates hoped that even if the manner of distributing the
state’s wealth was regrettable, the outcome would be salutary.  New owners,
motivated by profit, would improve the privatized companies’ operations.  The
new owners would get rich, perhaps undeservedly, but the whole country would
benefit from the productivity gains.
These hopes have not been fulfilled.  This Part seeks to understand why.
Sections A-D are the theoretical core of this article. They develop a framework
for understanding why Russia’s corporate owners and managers often chose
self-dealing over company building, and apply that framework to the Russian
environment.  Sections E and F discuss the outcomes from voucher privatization
and the kleptocrats' actions after they acquired control of Russia’s biggest
companies.  Part IV turns to the counterfactual: what might have happened with
slower privatization and greater efforts to build market-supporting institutions.
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A.  The Controller’s Dilemma: Build Value or Loot?
Consider a stylized account of the dilemma facing a Russian manager or
outside investor who acquires control of a privatized firm.  The controller wishes
to maximize his private return on investment.  He is, we will assume, amoral,
interested only in personal gain.  In the short run, he has nearly absolute power
over his firm’s decisions and faces no restrictions on self-dealing.  If the
enterprise isn’t viable, our amoral controller will steal what he can, leaving an
empty shell behind.  The more interesting case is when the firm is potentially
profitable.  How will the controller behave?
There are two basic  ways for our hypothetical amoral controller to earn
private returns.  The first (the “value-creating” strategy) is to increase the
firm’s value, and thus the value of the controller’s fractional stake in the firm.
The second (the “self-dealing” strategy) is to expropriate value from other
claimants.  For example, by self-dealing enough to extract all of the firm’s free
cash flow, the controller can appropriate the payments that would otherwise go
to the government as income taxes or to minority shareholders as dividends.  By
self-dealing beyond this point, the controller can skim revenues that would
otherwise go to pay the firm’s suppliers, employees, or creditors. 
If the value creating and self-dealing strategies were independent, an
amoral controller would maximize returns along each dimension independently.
He would create as much value as possible and steal as much of that value as
possible.  The two strategies are not independent, however.  A controller who
skims revenues owed to suppliers and employees risks destroying the firm’s
going concern value.  Suppliers and employees can’t be defrauded indefinitely,
even if they have no legal recourse.  Sooner or later, they will stop doing
business with the firm.
Even for self-dealing limited to a firm’s free cash flow, there are tradeoffs
between increasing value and self-dealing.  For example, if the controller skims
the firm’s profits while continuing to pay its suppliers and employees, he
expropriates the government’s income tax revenues and the value of minority
shares without jeopardizing the firm’s survival.  But the firm will be unable to
obtain external financing to pursue new business opportunities or support major
investments.  Nor can the controller use internal financing for these purposes
without revealing the firm’s profitability to the tax authorities and minority
investors.  Moreover, it may be hard to skim tax payments without also stiffing
suppliers and employees.  A company that pays its suppliers and employees
reveals that it can afford to pay some taxes (or bribes in lieu thereof), which the
tax authorities will try to collect. 
A controller also can’t expropriate the value of minority shares and then sell
the company at fair value to a new owner.  The steps taken to expropriate the
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minority will conceal the firm’s profitability.  Potential buyers will discount
heavily claims about true value by controllers who have proven themselves
untrustworthy by expropriating minority shareholders.  Finally, a controller may
be skilled at self-dealing or creating value but not both.  
For all these reasons, self-dealing will decrease a profitable firm's value.
The controller can’t independently maximize returns from creating value and
self-dealing; he must maximize them jointly.  With no enforcement, controllers
are likely to pursue a mixed strategy.  A controller who mostly maximizes value
is likely to also extract some private returns.  Conversely, a controller who
mostly self-deals will likely keep a potentially viable firm alive.  A firm that
continues to operate can bring in new funds from suppliers, employees,
creditors, and perhaps the government and shareholders, as long as it can find
new contracting parties or pay the old ones just enough to keep their hopes of
full payment alive.  Moreover, keeping the firm alive lets the controller retain the
option to sell the firm or build value in the future if business conditions improve.
The tension between creating value and looting increases as the risk of
future sanctions grows.  Consider the extreme case in which sanctions are
certain, but won’t be imposed for a while.  Thieves who will be caught if they
linger too long won’t capture the firm’s long-term value anyway.  An amoral
controller then has a sharp choice: create value (perhaps with self-dealing at a
level that is unlikely to lead to sanctions), or steal as much as you can and then
flee the jurisdiction before the police arrive.
In Russia, with enforcement uncertain, most controllers of viable enterprises
would likely pursue a mixed strategy of enhancing firm value and grabbing the
existing value.  The critical question is: How much of each will they do?
In our view, three broad classes of factors shape controllers’ choices.  The
first (Section B)  is the legal and institutional infrastructure that affects the level
of self-dealing that is feasible and the risk that self-dealing will lead to sanctions.
The second (Section C) includes general regulatory and economic factors that
affect all firms, especially the overall business climate.  The third (Section D)
includes factors associated with particular firms or controllers. 
B.  Russia’s Legal and Institutional Infrastructure
Consider first the legal and institutional constraints on self-dealing.  The
Soviet Union wasn’t a very honest place to begin with.  At the same time, the
scale of dishonesty was limited.  Managers and workers in stores could
appropriate and resell some of the best goods, but there were others whose job
was to control this petty theft.  Managers of state-owned firms couldn’t set up
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transfer pricing schemes with other companies that the managers owned
because citizens couldn’t own companies.  Bureaucratic controls kept managers
away from direct access to the payments that a company received for its goods,
and provided oversight of those who had access to money.
Besides, the money from large-scale corruption couldn't buy very much—a
new Russian car or a nice vacation (but senior managers and government
officials already had cars and government-provided vacations), but not a fancy
house, a fat savings account (which would be noticed), or a foreign vacation or
bank account (both generally not possible).  And if you got caught being too
greedy, you faced a lengthy term in a miserable Russian jail or gulag (work
camp), which you certainly wouldn’t enjoy and might not survive.  Thus, we
disagree with those who claim that Russia was so hopelessly corrupt at the start
of the 1990s that little could be done to control managers’ theft of company
assets.
 In the early 1990s, Russia wholly lacked the institutional infrastructure to
control self-dealing.  Prosecutors, judges, and lawyers had no experience in
untangling corporate transactions or understanding of the indirect ways in which
company insiders can siphon off profits.  Concepts of fiduciary duty and
proscriptions against self-dealing didn’t exist.31  Russia had neither business
lawyers who could advise managers on how to behave towards shareholders,
nor accountants who could ensure accurate financial disclosure.  Its accounting
rules were designed to meet the needs of central planners, not investors.  The
Finance Ministry is gradually updating Russia’s accounting rules, but often
develops rules to determine how much tax a company owes rather than to help
investors understand the company’s cash flows.32
Basic commercial and capital markets laws didn’t exist when voucher
privatization was completed in 1994.  The tax rules all but compelled managers
to hide profits from tax inspectors and shareholders alike.  A Securities
Commission was created in 1994, but has a tiny budget, can’t pay its staff
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enough to keep qualified people, and lacks the political clout to investigate
kleptocrat misdeeds. 
Finally, the business culture was one of law avoidance.  Under Communist
rule, a good manager often had to obtain the parts and supplies needed to keep
a factory running in unofficial ways.33  In a market economy, those skills were
easily transferred to the new tasks of asset stripping and self-dealing.
The weak legal and institutional framework was no secret to the privatizers.
But writing good laws can take years and building good institutions takes
decades.  The privatizers weren’t willing to wait.  They chose to privatize
immediately, and hope that the laws and institutions would follow later.  The
laws did indeed follow.  The first two Parts of a new Civil Code were adopted
in 1995-96. A weak law on securities (since modestly strengthened) was
adopted in 1995; a fairly strong law on joint stock companies in 1996; decent
laws on bankruptcy and limited liability companies in 1998.  These laws have
weaknesses, but no more so than the laws in many other developing countries.
But the privatizers hoped for more than just decent laws.  They hoped that
broad private ownership would create a constituency for strengthening and
enforcing those laws.  That didn't happen.  Instead, company managers and
kleptocrats opposed efforts to strengthen or enforce the capital markets laws.
They didn’t want a strong Securities Commission or tighter rules on self-dealing
transactions.  And what they didn’t want, they didn’t get.
The tax rules are revised periodically, but haven’t improved much.  Why
isn’t clear.  Perhaps their vagueness lets most businesses escape with a modest
payment to the tax inspectors (and little to the government).  The Finance
Ministry and the tax inspectors mostly oppose reform, perhaps because clear
rules and reasonable rates would reduce bribes.  Perhaps too, company
managers aren’t too unhappy with the current system.  They must hide their
income, but can then steal the hidden profits.34  
IMF intervention didn’t help.  A core IMF condition for new loans was
higher tax revenues now.  Lower tax rates and less administrative discretion
wouldn’t achieve that. In contrast, reforming the tax system was a soft
condition that the IMF never insisted on.  But Russia's drive to collect more tax
revenue was counterproductive.  Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP declined
while corruption intensified, as businesses responded to higher tax demands with
larger bribes.
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The kleptocrats were able to co-opt the Central Bank and the Finance
Ministry into opposing a strong securities law or Securities Commission.  The
Central Bank’s bureaucrats were none too honest themselves,35 and didn’t need
much convincing that they, not the upstart Securities Commission, ought to
control Russia’s capital markets.  As a result, the Securities Commission has
limited powers and ended up in a protracted fight for political survival, which
took most of what little resources it had. 
The government’s own behavior reinforced disrespect for rules.  Managers
had to cheat on their taxes, bribe tax and customs inspectors, and avoid cash
transactions to survive.  The government didn't pay its own bills to companies
that provided it with goods and services, hardly an incentive for those companies
to pay their tax bills.  It became increasingly clear that corruption went right to
the top—to the extended Yeltsin "family."36
Company managers soon learned that they could plunder their firms with
negligible risk of prosecution.  For example, it’s been almost two years since the
1998 ruble collapse exposed self-dealing at Russian banks and prompted a race
to strip the assets that remained.  Yet not a single bank official has been
charged with anything.  Khodorkovski’s Bank Menatep offers an example of
how the bankers behaved.  After Bank Menatep collapsed in mid-1998,
Khodorkovski transferred its good assets to a new bank, Menatep-St.
Petersburg, leaving depositors and creditors to pick at the old bank’s carcass.
To ensure that the transactions couldn’t later be traced, Khodorkovski arranged
for a truck containing most of Bank Menatep’s records for the last several
years to be driven off a bridge into the Dybna river.  Where presumably they
will remain.37
Russia’s core problem today is less lack of decent laws than lack of the
infrastructure and political will to enforce them.38  For example, the company
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18, 27 (“In cases involving the oligarchs, trial and appellate judges are routinely bribed.  Failing that,
judges who evince a dangerous predisposition to impartiality are reassigned without explanation by
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40 See Jeanne Whalen & Bhushan Bahree, How Siberian Oil Field Turned into a  Minefield,
WALL S T .   J ., Feb.  9, 2000, at A21, (quoting Potanin).  Bernard Black was an advisor to a minority
shareholder in Kondpetroleum in litigation against Sidanko and BP Amoco (a large Sidanko
shareholder) for looting Kondpetroleum.  For other pieces of the Chernogoneft bankruptcy story,
see Igor Semenenko, Siberian Oil Company Fights Hostile Takeover, MOSCOW T IMES, May 29,
1999; Alan S. Cullison, Russia’s Tyumen Oil Seeks to Expand with Some Assets of Troubled Sidanko,
WALL ST. J., July 8, 1999, at A12; Neela Banerjee, From Russia, With Bankruptcy, N.Y.  T IMES,
law prohibits much of the rampant self-dealing by managers and large
shareholders that occurs every day.  But the courts respect only documentary
evidence, which is rarely available given limited discovery and managers’ skill
in covering their tracks.  
Moreover, a shareholder who sues a major company will usually lose at trial
and first-level appeal, because of home-court bias, judicial corruption, or both.
A shareholder with a strong case has a decent chance of getting an honest
decision on further appeal, but that will take years.  And judgments must be
enforced (or, often, not enforced) by the same biased or corrupt lower court
where the case began.39
A recent example: The bankruptcy proceedings for Sidanko, an oil holding
company owned by kleptocrat Vladimir Potanin, and Chernogoneft and
Kondpetroleum, two key Sidanko subsidiaries.  Chernogoneft and
Kondpetroleum went bankrupt after selling oil to Sidanko, which failed to pay
for the oil and was itself looted so severely that it went bankrupt.  In the
Chernogoneft bankruptcy proceedings, 98% of the creditors voted for one
external manager, but the local judge appointed a different manager with ties to
Tyumen Oil, owned by kleptocrat Mikhail Fridman, which wanted to acquire
Chernogoneft cheap.  The court also rejected a Chernogoneft offer to pay all
creditors in full!  Tyumen was able to buy Chernogoneft for $176 million and
Kondpetroleum for $52 million (a small fraction of actual value), in what Potanin
publicly called “an atmosphere of unprecedented pressure on the court
system.”40  Which apparently means that Tyumen didn’t merely bribe judges
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intimidated local judges and complains that “If they just stuck to bribing judges, we could play that
game too.”); Wolosky (2000), supra note 39, at 30 (reporting the beating).
42 See,  e .g ., Gary Peach, Sidanko Squabbles Give Investment a Bad Name, MOSCOW T IMES,
June 1, 1999, at 14 (court rejects external manager proposed by 80% of Sidanko’s creditors).
43 See OLIVIER BLANCHARD , THE ECONOMICS OF POST-COMMUNIST TRANSI T I O N  (1997).
44 See Wolosky (2000), supra note 39, at 27.
45 See BLACK , KRAAKMAN & TARASSOVA (1998), supra note 1; Jonathan R. Hay & Andrei
Shleifer, Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform, 88 AMER. ECON. REV.
(Papers & Proceedings) 398 (1998).
(Sidanko could have offered its own bribes), but threatened them as well.
Indeed, a judge who issued an early ruling against Tyumen was beaten for his
troubles.41
Sidanko’s bankruptcy was marked by similar irregularities, some reflecting
a battle between Potanin and Fridman for control of the proceedings.42  Other
prominent bankruptcy cases were also rigged by insiders, with the cooperation
of the courts and (for bankrupt banks) the Central Bank.43
Prosecutors are no better than judges.  The reported price to stall a criminal
investigation into, say, a business-related Mafia hit:  $50,000 in Moscow; less
elsewhere.44
The privatizers, ourselves included, underestimated the extent to which
functioning law requires honest courts and prosecutors that can redress gross
violations.  We called the Russian company law that we helped to draft a “self-
enforcing” model because we thought that stating sensible rules would
encourage corporate norms to coalesce around those rules (even with minimal
enforcement), and that the courts could enforce simple procedural rules (for
example, approval of self-dealing transactions by noninterested shareholders).45
Instead, self-dealing transactions were hidden, courts were of little help even
when self-dealing was obvious, and managerial culture coalesced around
concealing self-dealing instead of our intended norm of disclosure and a
noninterested shareholder vote.
We’ve thought since about ways to strengthen the constraints on self-
dealing.  For example, requiring a company’s accountants to report to
shareholders on any self-dealing transactions they find and whether those
transactions were completed in compliance with the company law would make
it harder to conceal self-dealing.  But our central view is that if enforcement is
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weak enough, these and other possible changes to Russia’s current not-so-bad
rules won’t matter much.
Having recounted Russia's many weak institutions, we should mention a
problem that Russia didn't have in the early 1990s, at least in severe form.
Theorists have speculated that social "trust"—the willingness of people to deal
fairly with each other and expect others to do likewise—is an important market-
supporting institution.46  We have no sense that Russia was an especially low-
trust country at the beginning of the 1990s.  Russians didn't trust their
government, but enterprise managers routinely dealt with each other on an oral
basis (often to circumvent formal regulations).  Indeed, these informal contacts
helped to make extensive barter chains a feasible substitute for cash-based
transactions.  One of the tragedies of Russian misgovernment in the 1990s is
that Russia is a far more corrupt and lower-trust place today than a decade ago,
with all that implies for its future prospects.
C.  Economy-Wide Factors
A second broad class of factors that influence a controller’s choice
between value creation and self-dealing are economy-wide factors that affect
a firm’s potential profitability, and thus the opportunity cost from self-dealing
instead of creating value.
1.  The Overall Business Climate
A key factor is predicting the extent of looting is the overall business
climate.  The worse the business climate, the smaller the expected gains from
creating value, and thus the more likely that controllers are to loot instead.
Moreover, many state-owned enterprises will fail, and even viable enterprises
will generally need to shed workers to improve productivity.  New businesses
must take up the employment slack.  If they don’t emerge, the market pressure
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on large firms to restructure will be weaker; political pressure for firms to
maintain employment and related social services will be stronger.47
Russia's business climate was lousy.  We discuss the most important
problems below, in rough order of importance.
a.  Tax.  Perhaps the single most important regulatory obstacle to earning
an honest profit was the Russian tax system.  Russian tax law is both amazingly
complex and quite simple.  The complex part is the vague and constantly
changing rules and administrative interpretations.  The nominal tax rates aren’t
extreme, but apply to a measure of “income” that grossly overstates actual
income.  Actual taxes can easily exceed 100% of profits.  In addition, tax
inspectors have broad discretion to seize a company’s bank accounts and other
assets to pay whatever taxes the inspector claims are due.  Companies can
appeal, but will be out of business long before the appeal is heard.  Tax audits
have become a potent political weapon, deployed by the government against
businesses that don’t support the incumbents.48
The simple part is how businesses behave: The confiscatory rates produce
derisory revenues, because almost no one pays them.  Instead, everyone hides
income as best they can and bribes the tax inspectors to reduce whatever initial
assessment the inspectors make.  An important reason for Russia’s
development of an extensive barter economy is that cash in a bank account
invites the tax inspectors to seize it.49
Falsified books preclude strong public  capital markets.  Companies that
can’t report income honestly to the tax inspectors also can’t report honestly to
investors.  Investors therefore can't use a company’s financial statements to
check on management honesty and skill.  They have to hope that the company
is profitable and (usually in vain) that managers won’t steal its hidden income.
The frequent use of barter makes matters still worse.  In a barter transaction
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that involves multiple intermediaries and is designed to hide true profits from the
tax inspectors, the opportunities for insiders to skim profits are endless and the
prospects of catching them are remote.
Hidden transactions also preclude using the courts to enforce contracts.  If
the true contract between two companies involves a large quantity of goods at
a high price, while the nominal contract (prepared for the tax inspectors)
specifies a small quantity at a much lower price, and one party defaults, the
other can hardly go to court to enforce the true deal. 
b.  Corruption.  The need to pay multiple bribes—to tax inspectors, to
customs officials, to the police not to harass you, to the many bureaucrats from
whom you need a permit to operate—has landed Russia near the bottom of
most lists of official corruption.50  Russia may be better than Nigeria, but not by
much.
Moreover, while payoffs to organized crime provide protection against
similar demands by competing Mafia groups, payoffs to government officials
don’t protect you against demands by other officials.  The combined bribe
demanded by multiple officials can be far larger than a “monopoly” official,
seeking to maximize long-term income, would demand.51  Corruption and the
unfriendly bureaucracy are closely connected.  Corrupt officials look for
opportunities to enforce picky rules and add new rules.
c.  Unfriendly bureaucrats. Russian red tape, often dating from the Soviet
era when businessmen needed planning ministry permission to do almost
anything, can be overwhelming.  An average new business must obtain
permission from “20-30 agencies and receive 50-90 approved registration
forms.”52  On average, Russian shops take three months to register (versus
three weeks in Poland), are inspected 83 times per year (versus half that in
Poland), and are fined 19% of the time (versus 9% in Poland).53  Disfavored
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(read: new) businesses are inspected far more often than these averages, and
the price of not being fined is usually bribing the inspector.54
d.  Organized crime.  If there is a street-level retail establishment in a
major Russian city that doesn’t pay a healthy share of revenue for “protection”,
we haven’t heard of it.  Arguing too strongly over how much to pay can reduce
one’s life expectancy, as can complaining to the police, who are likely to be in
the pay of the Mafia.  This leaves businesses to try to persuade their protectors
to leave them enough profit to stay in business.  
Many large businesses also engage private security forces.  But private
security is expensive, offers imperfect protection when goods are transported
to market, and can be turned to pernicious use—enforcing price-fixing and
market-division agreements with competitors or scaring off competitors.  More
generally, Russian managers can write off unpaid debts, try to enforce them
through ineffective courts, or engage their krysha (8DZT", Russian for “roof,”
a slang term for Mafia protection) to collect the bill.  They can compete on price
and quality or pay the krysha to put competitors out of business.  They can pay
the bribes demanded by local officials or hire the krysha to negotiate a lower
payment.55  Yet when managers rely on the Mafia for services like these, they
strengthen the Mafia, strengthen government-Mafia ties, shorten managers’
time horizons (you could be put out of business next), and contribute to a lawless
environment.
If a company stays small, it has a better chance of staying out of sight of tax
inspectors, other bureaucrats, and the Mafia.  Russia is the only country we
know where small businesses routinely avoid publicity and obtain customers only
by word of mouth.  Business cards commonly contain no telltale address, and
often not even a local phone number (the prefix will give away the business’s
approximate location).  Even retail businesses often operate from behind
unlabeled doors.
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e.  Subsidies to unprofitable firms.  A rational capital market provides
funds to profitable businesses and starves unprofitable ones.  The Russian
government usually did the opposite—funneling subsidies to money-losing
businesses, often by accepting nonpayment of wages, taxes, and energy bills.
Subsidies for losses let a controller loot the same asset multiple times.56  The
explicit and implicit government subsidies to money-losing firms are
huge—around 15-20% of GDP.57  Meanwhile, profitable Russian businesses
are targets of opportunity for tax collectors, the Mafia, and bribe-seeking
bureaucrats.  And the products produced by subsidized competitors drive down
market prices and lower the profitability of otherwise viable firms. 
f .  Urban land.  Starting a new business or growing an existing one
requires land.  In most Russian regions, urban land hasn't been privatized.
Obtaining land requires bribing government officials, who can then collect taxes
from you, tell their Mafia buddies about you, and revoke your land rights if you
don’t pay enough taxes or bribes.  Moreover, insecure land rights mean that
businesses won’t invest much in immoveable buildings or equipment, and thus
won’t grow very large or employ many people.
g.  Lack of capital.  Russians have limited savings and don’t trust banks.
A recent good reason: In 1991-1993, the government froze private savings held
in the state savings bank and confiscated almost all of those savings by paying
interest rates far below inflation.  About $100 billion in savings that might have
helped to found new businesses was wiped out, and Russians learned to keep
savings away from domestic  banks, often in hard currency, and hence
unavailable to support new investment. 
Those citizens who put savings into the new private banks, often run by
kleptocrats, soon regretted that choice.  During and after the 1998 ruble crash,
a bank run ensued, and many banks refused to honor depositor demands for
their funds.  The Central Bank was in no hurry to straighten out the mess, and
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58 On the Central Bank’s ineffective response to bank failures, see Mark Whitehouse,
Frustration Soars for Russian Bank Depositors: Moscow Does Little to Resolve Crisis, WALL ST. J.,
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59 As one Western law firm recently warned its clients, when “Russian employees sue foreign
companies in Russian courts for wrongful termination, they usually win.”  Mary Holland & Olga
Kozyr, Downsizing Russian-Style, CIS  LAWNOTES (Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler),  Mar. 1999,
at 6, 7.
allowed bank controllers to strip the banks of their remaining assets, leaving
depositors and creditors with an empty shell.58
h.  A dysfunctional banking system. It was not for nothing that Jeffrey
Sachs once called Central Bank head Viktor Gerashchenko perhaps the worst
central banker in history.  He not only mishandled monetary policy; he tolerated
and perhaps personally benefitted from a system in which the reported (bribe)
cost of  transferring funds through the banking system from one part of Russia
to another was around 15% of the amount transferred.  That drove business
activity underground and made it hard to conduct business across long distances
at all.
i.  Unfriendliness to foreign investment.  Foreign investors face additional
problems, including ever-changing currency regulations that make it hard to
withdraw money once invested and ensure that the Central Bank takes a cut of
every dollar that is withdrawn.  The regulations don’t stop capital flight, because
the kleptocrats and other major players exploit loopholes or bribe their way out
of compliance.  Instead, they discourage honest capital from entering.
j.  Labor laws.  Russia’s labor laws, dating from its Communist days,
formally prohibit most layoffs, and in practice make them expensive.  Even top
managers can’t be easily fired.  Standard practice is to pay employees to leave
voluntarily.  Many businesses don’t pay their employees on time or in full, but
honestly run or foreign-owned businesses can’t escape so easily.59
2.  Macroeconomic Performance
A second key factor that affects firm controllers’ expected gains from
value creation, and thus the level of self-dealing they will engage in, is a
country’s macroeconomic  performance.  Macroeconomic performance
interacts with the business climate and with asset stripping.  The worse the
business climate, the more asset stripping will take place, and the worse
macroeconomic  performance will be.  In a vicious circle, poor macroeconomic
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60 Simon Johnson, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach & Eric Friedman, Corporate Governance in
the Asian Financial Crisis (working paper 1999), argue that such a vicious circle can help to explain
the 1997-98 financial collapses in a number of countries. 
61 The exchange-rate problem was suggested to us by Gerhard Pohl.  He sees the too-high ruble
valuation as central to Russian firms’ troubles.  In contrast, we see it as only one factor that affected
profit opportunities.  Also, the decline in the sustainable ruble/dollar exchange rate partly reflects
the declining productivity of Russian industry.  Thus, the ruble’s overvaluation may be as much a
result of other factors as an independent cause of low profitability.
62 See Robert Orttung, Newly Elected Regional Governors Grapple with Moscow, in ANNUAL
SURVEY OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION: 1997—THE CHALLENGES OF
INTEGRATION 285 (Peter Rutland ed., 1998).
6 3  Employment data tell a similar story.  See Broadman (2000), supra note 52 (small  and
medium Russian enterprises employ only 13% of workers, compared to 53% in the United States and
37-58% in selected other transition economies).
performance then further depresses firm profitability and encourages asset
stripping.60
Our overall judgment is that Russia’s macroeconomic policy decisions were
sometimes poor but not terrible.  Inflation was brought under reasonable control
by around 1995, and the budget deficit was tolerable.  On the other hand, high
real interest rates chilled investment.  And from 1995 through 1998, Russia’s
central bank managed the ruble/dollar exchange rate, letting the ruble gradually
slide against the dollar.  The ruble’s roughly 75% devaluation in 1998 suggests
that the ruble was overvalued before devaluation, which made Russian
businesses less competitive.61 
Some evidence of the overall chill on business, from both micro and macro
factors: At a time when business opportunities should have been abundant and
workers readily available, the number of small Russian businesses dropped from
877,000 in 1995 (many started in an early 1990s burst of enthusiasm) to 829,000
in 1997.62  On a per capita basis, this is about a quarter of the number of small
American businesses.63  The Russian pattern of firms not paying workers for
months on end is possible only because workers have no alternative.  In
successful post-Communist countries, even state-owned firms have shrunk
payrolls and improved productivity.  In Russia, it is common for a privatized firm
to have cut production by 50% since 1991, but to have cut employment by only
10%.
Capital flight is another good measure of the investment climate.  For those
who follow Russia’s woes, the $10 billion Bank of New York money laundering
scandal that broke in 1999 was uninteresting.  We merely learned how a small
fraction of the money that has left Russia (a ballpark estimate is $200 billion
36 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:XXX
64 On the Bank of New York scandal, see, e.g., Andrew Higgins, Alan S. Cullison, Michael Allen
& Paul Beckett, Brash Russian Banker and His Deals are Key to Laundering Probe, WALL ST .  J . ,
Aug. 26, 1999, at A1; Andrew Higgins, Paul Beckett & Ann Davis, A Scheme for Ducking Taxes May
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ST. J., Apr. 19, 1999, at A19.
65 On overall foreign direct investment, see TROIKA DIALOG RESEARCH , FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT (2000) (reporting data from the State Statistics  Committee).   On oil sector
investment, see Jeanne Whalen & Bhushan Bahree, How Siberian Oil Field Turned Into a Minefield,
WALL ST.  J., Feb.  9, 2000, at A21 (estimating foreign investment in the oil sector at $3.9 billion
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during the 1990s) happened to leave.  The money is still leaving, just by another
route.64
The lack of foreign investment is a further measure of the business climate.
Russia’s official statistics estimate cumulative foreign direct investment at a
scant $13 billion from 1992 through 1999.  Even the major oil companies, no
strangers to tough political environments, have invested little and lost much of
what they invested.65
3.  Other Factors
Some additional important market-wide factors that affect the upside from
a value creation strategy, and thus the likelihood of looting:
a.  An inefficient capital market.  The harder it is to raise capital or sell
one’s stake at a fair price, the less the incentive to build firm value.  In Russia,
public  offerings at fair value weren’t possible because disclosing true profits to
investors meant disclosing them to tax inspectors also.  A private buyer can be
shown a company’s true books.  But the general prevalence of self-dealing
makes it hard to persuade investors that a particular controller is (or will stay)
honest.  Russian firms also can’t address investor suspicions by getting auditors
to vouch for the company’s books, since the real books are unofficial.
b.  Uncertainty and controllers’ effective time horizons (or implicit
discount rates).  A value-increasing strategy often requires investing capital in
the near term, and generates additional cash only in the long run.  Economic and
political uncertainty makes long-term profits less certain, and hence less
valuable. 
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66 On barriers to competition, see Broadman (2000), supra note 52.  On the correlation between
competition and productivity, see J. David Brown & John Earle, Competition and Firm Performance:
Lessons from Russia (working paper 2000), available in Social Science Research Network at
<http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=222229>.
 c.  Product market competition.  Strong competition provides incentives
to restructure enterprises and reduces the rents that a controller can loot.  In
Russia, multiple factors weakened product market competition: privatized
enterprises were often monopoly providers in their region; the poor business
climate discouraged new entry; trade barriers limited import competition; poor
transportation and state-owned local distribution monopolies limited import and
interregional competition.66
D.  Firm-Specific and Controller-Specific Factors
In addition to these market-wide factors, a number of factors that were
specific  to particular firms, or particular controllers, affected the likelihood that
a firm’s controllers would choose self-dealing as their dominant strategy.
a.  Firm profitability.  The more profitable a firm is (holding constant the
market-wide factors discussed above), and the stronger its growth opportunities,
the greater the opportunity cost from self-dealing.  Privatizing non-viable firms
was an open invitation to loot them.
b.  Managerial skill.  Poor management reduces a firm’s expected
earnings, and thus reduces the opportunity cost of self-dealing.  Voucher
privatization left the old managers in control.  Many could muster the skill to
strip assets but were incapable of adapting to a competitive market, even if they
wanted to.
c.  Separation between control and cash flow rights.  The smaller the
controller's percentage holdings of cash flow rights and the weaker his hold on
future control, the smaller the foregone gain from creating value, while the
benefits of self-dealing remain the same.  From this perspective, voucher
privatization is inherently dangerous because it separates control from cash flow
rights, not only for the largest firms, for which this separation is hard to avoid,
but for mid-sized firms that often have concentrated ownership in developed
economies.  Pyramid structures or dual-class voting structures that let
controllers maintain control with a fraction of a firm's cash flow rights further
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encourage asset stripping.  Yet pyramid structures were built into many of
Russia's largest enterprises.  
With no constraints on self-dealing, honest management and dispersed
ownership are an unstable combination.  A controlling stake is worth more to a
self-dealer, who will extract 100% or more of the firm’s value from 51% of the
shares, than to an honest owner who will keep only his prorata share of the
firm’s profits.  Bad owners will thus tend to drive out good ones.67  
Letting voucher investment funds aggregate the ownership stakes of
individuals lets the funds provide a counterweight to managerial control of firms,
but recreates the self-dealing problem at a different level—investment fund
controllers can strip assets both from the funds and the companies that the
funds control.  As we argue in Part V.C, investment fund managers are more
likely than company managers to find asset stripping attractive.
d.  Prosecution risk and effective time horizons.  Economic and political
uncertainty makes time horizons short (implicit discount rates high) for all
managers.  A controller who pursues a self-dealing strategy faces a still shorter
horizon (a higher implicit discount rate), because of the risk that a future
government will prosecute the controller for current self-dealing.  This risk
doesn't affect the firm's value, but reduces the value of the controller's stake in
the firm.  The Russian kleptocrats, having gotten the money to buy major firms
in questionable ways, already faced future prosecution risk, which enhanced the
attractiveness of asset stripping.
e.  The controller's morals.  Our informal model of the asset stripping
decision assumes an amoral controller.  In the real world, morals matter.  Some
controllers will seek to create value rather than steal it, as long as they have
decent prospects of doing so.  Others will see skimming as a quick way to
generate a handsome return on investment, and won't evaluate whether a value-
creating strategy might be optimal in the long term.  Give control of an
enterprise to a crook and he’s likely to loot it, whatever its long-term prospects.
In Russia, market-wide and firm-specific factors combined to make self-
dealing the strategy of choice for many otherwise viable firms.  Self-dealing
was easy, running a business for profit was hard, growth prospects were dim,
voucher privatization separated control from cash flow rights, controllers' time
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horizons were short, capital markets were rudimentary, managerial skill was
scarce, unprofitable firms were subsidized while profitable ones were heavily
taxed, and many businesses were sold to crooks who were predisposed to self-
dealing.
E.  Mass-Privatized Enterprises: Manager Theft and Incompetence
Voucher privatization left Communist-appointed managers in control of most
privatized enterprises.  The privatizers hoped that outside investors would invest
in salvageable firms and profit by installing better management.  That happened
in a few cases.  Sometimes outsiders reached an accord with the company’s
managers to buy a stake directly from the company; sometimes they bought
controlling stakes in the market or by hiring agents to stand at the company’s
gates and make offers directly to employees.  Occasionally, managers sought
outside investors and accepted oversight in return.
But more often, enterprise managers acted in dubious ways to acquire more
shares and thereby cement their control.  Managers had the easiest access to
employees’ shares, and often bought them at very low prices, sometimes by
threatening retribution if the employees didn’t sell.  Sometimes shares were
bought with company funds, but the managers ended up with the shares.  Other
times, managers siphoned funds from the company through self-dealing, which
they used both to buy employee shares and to improve their own standard of
living.68 
Not infrequently, manager self-dealing compromised the firms’ viability.
Russia’s coal industry offers an example.  Many coal-mining firms were
doomed to fail.  But even potentially profitable firms were sometimes
bankrupted by crooked managers.  Common skimming techniques included:
selling the coal to an intermediary at below-market prices; buying mining
equipment at inflated prices; and paying workers with vouchers redeemable at
the company store, which sells goods to this captive market at above market
prices; with the managers in each case pocketing the difference.  Coal workers
and their unions, instead of asking where the cash went, periodically go on strike
against the Government for unpaid back wages, sometimes shutting down
railways to dramatize their claims.
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An irony: Privatized land, while valuable for new businesses, would have
been a mixed blessing if coupled with mass privatization.  Land was the most
valuable asset of many businesses.  If salable, it often would have been sold
cheaply to insiders, robbing shareholders of some of the value that their
enterprises otherwise retain.
Not every privatized enterprise was run by crooks.  But many were, and
many managers who started out honest changed their minds because they saw
what their fellow managers were able to get away with; the tax system
demanded that profits be hidden (which made them easy to steal); they saw the
Mafia and dishonest managers becoming wealthy while they struggled to
survive; and the authorities were too corrupt to do anything about obvious theft.
Others, discouraged by the hostile business environment, sold out to crooks, who
could earn a swift return on their investment in ways that honest managers
couldn’t.  Honest and dishonest behavior alike can be contagious, and Russia
fell into a dishonesty equilibrium.69
Hard data on the extent of looting of mass privatized enterprises isn’t
available.  Our own qualitative sense: Transfer pricing schemes and other
dodges to hide profits from tax collectors and minority shareholders are all but
universal.  A few controllers invest some of the hidden profits in new capital
equipment, but many more pocket the profits, often offshore.  Total business
investment is very low.  We discuss in Part IV.B the mixed evidence on
whether privatized firms show higher productivity than non-privatized firms.
F.  Major Enterprises: Kleptocrat Looting
The enterprises that were privatized through voucher privatization were
large in number, but often small in value.  But there was enormous value in
Russia’s natural resources companies, related companies (steel and aluminum
mills), and power and telephone companies.  The government sold at most
minority stakes in these companies during voucher privatization, and sold
controlling stakes later, through loans-for-shares and other “auctions.”
Estimates of these companies’ value, if permitted to sell their products at market
value, run to maximize profit, and valued at developed country multiples , are
often staggering.  Table II gives some rough values (precise estimates aren’t
possible).
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How then, can Russia have a  total market capitalization at September 1999
of only around $20 billion?  How can the government be unable to pay the $2
billion it owed to the IMF in 1999 and unable to timely pay its own pensioners
and employees the modest amounts they are owed?
An inescapable answer is theft of these companies' value on a massive
scale by the kleptocrats who acquired them.  Theft at the time of sale, by buying
controlling interests for a tiny fraction of fair value; followed by extensive self-
dealing that left many of Russia’s most valuable companies unable (or unwilling)
to pay taxes, pay their workers, or reinvest.  
Russian share prices can be understood as out-of-the-money options:
Investors expect that the firm’s entire value will likely go to the government or
the firm’s controllers.  Minority shares still have some value because there is a
small positive probability of realizing a return sometime in the future.
42 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [VOL. 52:XXX
Table II
September 1999 Value Estimates for Major Russian Companies
Rough value estimates  for selected major Russian companies, if run to maximize
profit, taxed on that profit  at a 33% marginal rate, permitted to sell their
products at world prices, and valued at developed market multiples, provided
to us by James  Fenkner of the Troika Dialog investment bank.  Value estimates
for oil and gas  companies  are based on $13 per barrel of oil reserves (or gas
equivalent);  for electric  companies  on $795,000 per megawatt of generating
capacity; for steel companies on $148 per ton of capacity; for aluminum
companies on $2793 per ton of capacity; for Norilsk Nickel on .085 × value of
reserves at current commodity prices; for Rostelecom on 3.3 × book value of
property, plant and equipment; for Sberbank on 3.1 × book value of assets; for








Gazprom natural gas 1960 4
LUKOil oil 195 5.5







Tatneft oil 75 0.4
Sberbank bank 60 0.4
Tyumen Oil oil 47 not traded
Mosenergo electricity 12 0.8
Irkutskenergo electricity 10 0.4
Norilsk Nickel nickel 9 0.5
Rostelecom telephone 5 0.9
Bratsk Aluminum aluminum 2.3 0.03
Krasnoyarsk aluminum 2.2 0.08
Aeroflot airline 2 0.09
Magnitogorsk steel 1.8 0.04
Seversal steel 1.7 0.08
Total 2754 20.8
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70 See Joseph Kahn & Timothy L. O’Brien, For Russia and Its U.S. Bankers, Match Wasn’t
Made in Heaven, N.Y.  T IMES, Oct. 18, 1998, at A1 (reporting on Yukos’ dealings with subsidiaries).
71 See Geoff Winestock, The Quixotic Technocrat, MOSCOW T IMES, Mar. 31, 1998 (Securities
Commission head Dmitri  Vasiliev says that he was dissatisfied with Yukos' response to the
Commission’s investigation, but the Commission had no power to do any more).
Privatization proponents argued that privatization would put control of
Russia’s major companies in the hands of competent businessmen, who had
incentives to restructure these enterprises, replace managers who couldn’t
make the transition to a market economy, and make the investments needed to
improve productivity.  The kleptocrats devoted themselves instead to skimming
profits from their companies; starving them of funds (to the point where many
were unable to pay their workers or their tax bills, let alone invest in new
equipment); replacing managers who resisted the skimming (or
threatening/bribing them into submission); and shooting managers or local
government officials who resisted too strongly.
This story can only be told through anecdotes.  We offer five
below—hopefully enough to convince the reader that our strong words are
justified.  For the first four, we have firsthand knowledge of the shenanigans.
The fifth, Gazprom, is simply too big to be left out.
Khodorkovski/Yukos:  We recounted above the example of Yukos, whose
1996 oil revenues were reported at $8.60 per barrel, about $4 below what they
should have been, with the rest presumably skimmed.  But this was only part of
Yukos’ activity.  Yukos owned several operating subsidiaries, each with large
minority interests.  Yukos purchased oil from these subsidiaries at even lower
prices, averaging around $7.50 per barrel—low enough so that these
subsidiaries, with combined pretax profits of around $1 billion before Yukos
acquired control, were soon reporting minimal profits or outright losses, and
defaulting on their tax payments.  Yukos had bled them of whatever cash they
had.70 The subsidiaries’ sale of oil to Yukos, without approval by the
subsidiaries’ minority shareholders, was a flagrant violation of the company law,
but no matter.  No one sued, and if they had, well, judges could be bought or
their decisions ignored.  The transactions were flagrant enough to prompt the
Russian Securities Commission to investigate the dealings between Yukos and
its subsidiaries.  But the investigation went nowhere, perhaps because the
Commission didn’t have the staff to pursue it, or because it was warned off by
Khodorkovski’s government allies.71
Khodorkovski’s ambition exceeded his reach, however.  In 1997 and 1998,
he borrowed heavily from Western banks, using Yukos shares and guarantees
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72 For pieces of this story, see Selected Documents in Regard to Minority Shareholders Rights
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from Yukos’ subsidiaries as collateral.  When the Russian ruble collapsed in
mid-1998, Khodorkovski’s Bank Menatep, like most major banks, was heavily
exposed because of investments in ruble-denominated Russian government
bonds.  If one counts his offshore wealth, Khodorkovski surely could have
weathered this storm, but he chose instead to let Menatep and Yukos sink.
Yukos defaulted on its loan payments, which meant that 30% of its shares
would soon be seized by Western lenders.  But Khodorkovski still controlled
Yukos for the moment, and he used that control to strip Yukos of its real
value—ownership of its oil producing subsidiaries.
At each major subsidiary—Tomskneft, Yuganskneftegaz, and
Samaraneftegaz—each worth many billions of dollars based on their oil
reserves—Yukos proposed for shareholder approval the following package of
proposals, with minor variations:
(i) A massive new share  issuance to obscure  offshore  companies, at dirt-cheap
prices that valued the companies  at 1% or less of their true value, and perhaps
10% of their depressed trading prices.  Even that modest amount would  be
paid not in cash but in  promissory notes issued by other Yukos subsidiaries,
of dubious legality and even more dubious value.  Enough shares were to be
issued (between 194% and 243% of the previously outstanding shares) to
transfer control from Yukos to the offshore companies.
(ii) A multiyear agreement obligating the subsidiary  to sell its  output to the
offshore companies at the laughable price of 250 rubles per ton (around $1.30
per barrel at mid-1999 exchange rates, and headed lower as the ruble
depreciates against the dollar).
(iii) Shareholder approval of large asset transfers  to still other obscure
companies, including both past and unidentified future transactions.
Shareholders who opposed these proposals were given the opportunity to sell
their shares back to the company at prices that valued the three companies, with
proven oil and gas reserves of around 13 billion barrels of oil equivalent, at a
total of $33 million—$.0025 per barrel of proven reserves. No, this is no t  a
misprint.72
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Vanishing Act: How Oil Giant Yukos Came to Resemble an Empty Cupboard,  WALL ST. J. EUR., July
15, 1999, at 1; Alan S. Cullison, Russian Share Shuffle Maddens Investors, WALL ST. J., July 23,
1999, at A12.  Yukos eventually settled with Kenneth Dart, reportedly buying his shares for over
$100 million—far above market value, but still far below their true value.  See Jeanne Whalen,
Russia’s Yukos to Buy Dart Stock, Ending Long Feud, WALL ST.  J., Dec.  21, 1999, at A16.
73 See, e.g., E,D(,6 G@B@& & _D46 7@>"R@8@& ,  7@>L:48H 42-2"
>,LH,`(">F8@(@ DZ>8"  2"8@>R4:Fb J$46FH&@< <^D" , 7@<<,DF">H\ [Sergei
Topov & Yuri Konachokov, Conflict  Over Nefteyugansk Market Ends in Mayor’s Assassination,
KOMMERSANT], June 27, 1998 (reporting the murder and the mayor’s conflicts with Yukos);
%:"*4<4D 9"*>46, 7D@& 4 =,LH\, 7@<F@<@:\8"b BD"&*"  [Vladimir Ladni, Blood
and Oil], KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA], at 2 (speculating that Khodorkovski and Yukos were likely
to be behind the attack).
74 See Grigori Mkrtchyan & Oleg Luriye, Holiday Contract ,  E?%+CS+==? E+7C+G=?
[TOP S ECRET], Mar. 1999 (interview with the intended victim, Yevgeni Rubin, about the attack, a
prior attack on his life three months earlier, and his conflicts with Yukos).
To be sure, Yukos needed shareholder approval for this raw theft.  Yukos
owned only 51% of the shares in the subsidiaries, and needed 75% of the votes
of the shareholders who participated in a shareholder meeting to authorize the
share issuance (plus a majority of the votes of noninterested shareholders).
Khodorkovski’s solution was bold, if not exactly legal: The day before the
subsidiaries’ shareholder meetings, Yukos arranged for a compliant judge to
declare that the minority shareholders were acting in concert, in violation of the
Antimonopoly Law.  The judge disqualified everyone but Yukos and its affiliates
from voting.  When minority shareholders arrived at the meetings, they were
greeted by armed guards; most were barred from voting or attending on the
basis of this court order.  Yukos’ shares were voted and were counted as
noninterested; the proposals all passed.  Having used Yukos' voting power to
ram through these proposals, Khodorkovski then transferred Yukos' remaining
shares in two of the three oil-producing subsidiaries to offshore companies.
Maybe, if oil prices stay strong, Khodorkovski will put Yukos back together.
Maybe in a few years, an appellate court will rule that all this was illegal.  But
the initial lawsuits have been abandoned.  And in the meantime, Khodorkovski
will have stolen billions through below-market sales of the subsidiaries’ oil.
Besides, opposing Yukos can be bad for one’s health.  The mayor of
Nefteyugansk was murdered in 1998, shortly after he publicly demanded that
Yukos subsidiary Yuganskneftegaz pay its local taxes and back wages.73  In
1999, Yevgeni Rubin, the head of a company which had won a lawsuit against
Yukos, had his car blown up near his home, with armed attackers waiting to
finish off anyone who survived the bomb.  By chance, he wasn’t inside, but his
bodyguards were less fortunate.74
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Hoffman, Russia’s Rookie Capitalists Can’t Count on Law, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1999, at A1
(Securities Commission, without Vasiliev, approves share issuance by Yukos subsidiary).
Khodorkovski’s behavior didn’t trouble senior Russian officials.  In the
middle of the scandal, he accompanied then Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov
on a trip to meet President Clinton (aborted in midair when NATO began
bombing Serbia).  It did trouble the Securities Commission, which launched an
investigation.  But the outcome of that investigation was hardly promising.  The
Chairman of the Securities Commission resigned in disgust, after failing to get
the cooperation he needed from other government agencies to bring a court
action; the Commission’s remaining members approved the share issuances.75
Berezovski/Sibneft: Sibneft is another major Russian oil holding company.
So far as anyone can tell, it is controlled by Boris Berezovski and his partner
Roman Abramovich (and perhaps also by Aleksandr Smolenski).  But no one
knows for sure, because Berezovski rarely owns shares in his own name, and
operates through obscure intermediary companies.  Sibneft’s main production
subsidiary is Noyabrskneftegaz, which in 1997 was 61% owned by Sibneft.  In
round numbers, Noyabrskneftegaz earned $600 million in 1996, before
Berezovski acquired control of Sibneft, and $0 in 1997.  Most of the missing
$600 million showed up as Sibneft profit, even though under the company law,
transactions between parent and subsidiary require approval by the subsidiary’s
minority shareholders, which was never obtained.
Simply appropriating Noyabrsk’s profits didn’t satisfy Berezovski.  At the
1998 Noyabrsk annual general meeting, shareholders were asked to approve a
new charter and a proposal to increase the number of  “announced” common
shares that could be issued by decision of the board of directors.  Management
announced at the shareholder meeting that it proposed new announced shares
equal to an astounding 196,300% of the current number of issued shares.
Virtually no shareholder other than Sibneft voted to authorize these shares, but
the authorization  squeaked through with the necessary support from 75% of the
shareholders who showed up and voted, perhaps because Sibneft hadn’t
previously disclosed how many shares it proposed to authorize and some
minority shareholders didn’t attend the meeting.
Noyabrsk’s charter provided for preemptive rights, which let all
shareholders buy newly issued shares in proportion to their current holdings.
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Robbery, Russian Style, ISSUE ALERT, Oct. 1998, at 3 (published by Institutional Shareholder
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Noyabrsk’s management ignored its charter and issued shares at roughly half
of Noyabrsk’s trading price (already severely depressed by Sibneft’s
expropriation of Noyabrsk’s profits) to four purchasers with close relationships
to Sibneft, ignoring along the way the company law requirements that shares be
issued at “market value” and that any transaction with a 20% shareholder or its
affiliated persons be approved by noninterested shareholders.
These actions enhanced Sibneft's trading price at the same time that they
depressed Noyabrsk’s trading price.  Sibneft then announced an exchange offer
to swap four Sibneft shares for each Noyabrskneftegaz share held by
Noyabrsk’s minority shareholders.  This exchange rate was around 4% of the
relative value of Noyabrsk and Sibneft, before this sorry saga started.  Most
minority shareholders accepted the offer—the alternative was no more
attractive.  One shareholder who sued found the local courts unreceptive.  The
local appellate court rejected the shareholder’s appeal on the astonishing
grounds that the lawyer’s signature on the appeal papers differed from the
signature on the original complaint (it didn’t, and it would make no difference
under Russian law if it had).  The shareholder settled rather than fight a years-
long battle in the upper appellate courts.76
Berezovski’s behavior hasn’t improved since.  After consolidating
Noyabrskneftegaz, Sibneft announced its intent to behave properly towards
minority shareholders in the future, adopted a nonbinding “Corporate
Governance Charter,” and appointed a high-profile Corporate Governance
Advisory Board.77  But anyone who believed that one should have remembered
the old lyric—“Fool me once, shame on you.  Fool me twice, shame on me.”
In early 2000, a Sibneft affiliate stiffed the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development on a $58 million loan, by persuading a persuadable Russian
court that it had paid the loan.78  
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they didn’t take my wallet, didn’t ask for anything.  Clearly they were just sending a message.”).  
80 Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman advised a minority Sidanko shareholder in connection
with the dilution effort described in the text. For pieces of the Sidanko story, see Jeanne Whalen,
Sidanko Bond Issue Tests Legal Water , MOSCOW  T I M E S, Feb. 10, 1998; Jeanne Whalen, Sidanko
Talks Tackle Bond Dispute, MOSCOW T IMES, Feb. 12, 1998; Jeanne Whalen, Shareholders Right:
Round 2, MOSCOW T IMES, Feb. 17, 1998; Jeanne Whalen, Sidanko President, Top Managers Quit,
MOSCOW T IMES, Mar. 17, 1998.
Like Khodorkovski, Berezovski isn’t a safe guy to sue, compete with, or
write unflattering stories about.  Those who try have a distressing tendency to
end up beaten, jailed, or dead.79
Potanin/Sidanko: Sidanko is another major Russian oil holding company,
which in 1998 was 96% controlled by Vladimir Potanin through Oneksimbank
and its affiliates, especially MFK (Mezhdunarodnaya Finansovaya Kompaniya).
Oneksimbank, and its affiliates also held significant stakes in Sidanko’s
subsidiaries.  Since MFK was trying to establish itself as the first major Russian-
owned investment bank, one might think that Potanin wouldn’t tarnish his
reputation by diluting the already small minority interest in Sidanko.  That
expectation, like many Western expectations about how Russian businessmen
concerned about reputation ought to behave, turned out to be unjustified.80
In early 1998, Potanin decided to kill two birds with one stone—simplify the
share ownership structure within the Oneksimbank financial-industrial group and
dilute the 4% minority in Sidanko.  The chosen means:  Sidanko issued
convertible bonds to Oneksimbank affiliates in exchange for their shares in other
group companies.  The conversion price was around 0.1% of Sidanko’s current
market price (this isn’t a typo either).  The effect was to more than triple
Sidanko’s outstanding shares, once the bonds were converted, and to dilute the
4% minority down to 1.3%.
This story had a temporarily not-too-unhappy ending for Sidanko’s minority
shareholders.  The shareholders screamed, the Securities Commission launched
an investigation into company law violations, and Sidanko agreed to issue
enough shares to minority shareholders at the same low price to compensate for
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the dilution caused by the convertible bond offering.  But investor satisfaction
didn’t last long.  After the ruble crash in mid-1998, Potanin found himself in
financial trouble (not counting his offshore assets, anyway).  He stripped
Oneksimbank of most of its remaining assets and looted Sidanko and its
subsidiaries as well.  Sidanko’s minority shareholders, including BP Amoco,
which paid $571 million for 10% of Sidanko (after the shenanigans described
above), found their shares nearly worthless.81
Zarubezhtsvetmet/Erdenet: We described above Russia’s illegal sale of its
$250 million stake in Erdenet for $150,000 by privatizing Zarubezhtsvetmet.
Now that Zarubezhtsvetmet’s (unknown) owners held 49% of Erdenet, how
would they behave?  Would they improve Erdenet’s operations or invest in the
new refining capacity that Erdenet wanted?
The answer was not long in coming.  In early 1998, it was discovered that
Erdenet was bankrupt, unable to pay either its taxes or its overdue bills for
electric  power.  Some $30 million had disappeared, surely with the connivance
of Erdenet’s general director, Mr. Elbegdorj.  The unpaid electric bills meant the
utilities couldn’t pay Russia for fuel, leaving Mongolia’s capital city,
Ulaanbaatar, mostly without heat for several months of a bitterly cold Mongolian
winter.  The Mongolian government sought to fire Elbegdorj and trace the
funds; the Russian members of Erdenet’s board of directors refused to
cooperate.  Their resistance deadlocked the company (which has three
Mongolian and three Russian board members) for the better part of a year.
Mongolia finally used emergency legislation to wrest control of Erdenet away
from Elbegdorj and his Russian accomplices.82
Gazprom: Gazprom’s wealth is fabulous.  Even a conservative $600 billion
estimate of its market value implies that privatizing this one company, on the
basis of one citizen, one share, could have delivered $4,000 in value to each
citizen.  That, plus honest management that delivered that value to shareholders,
would without more have redeemed the promise of mass privatization—that the
state was returning ownership of its property to the people.  Continued state
ownership would also have let the government finance its payments to
pensioners and employees, while still permitting future privatization.
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84 On Gazprom’s cash flow, see Adell Karian, Russia’s Dirtiest Secret: Where the Money Goes ,
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Putin’s Problem, INST’L INVESTOR, Apr. 2000, at 44, 50.
This was not to be.  Who owns how much of Gazprom is a secret, but its
managers received a huge cut.  In early 2000, the government still owned 38%,
while the managers’ official stake was around 35%, most of it held by a small
group of people who reportedly received stakes of 1% to 5% each—with each
percentage point worth multibillions at Western valuations.  That left another
25% in other hands.  Some of that ownership can be traced, but much is hidden.
Some of the hidden shares are likely also held by Gazprom insiders; how many
is anyone’s guess.  Gazprom chairman and former Russian Prime Minister
Viktor Chernomyrdin is rumored to be a major owner.  Meanwhile, Gazprom
pays little in taxes, despite its wealth and despite IMF complaints that Gazprom
is seriously undertaxed.83
How (dis)honestly Gazprom has been run is impossible to know from the
outside. Its reported revenues are around $30 billion per year.  Its true revenues
are hard to determine, because it faces political constraints on cutting off
important nonpaying customers (including Ukraine and Belarus).  Still, billions
of dollars per year could easily be getting skimmed instead of appearing in
Gazprom's financial accounts ; Gazprom has also transferred reserves worth
$30 billion or so to an unknown company that its managers presumably
control.84  Gazprom also spends money lavishly—including building a glitzy new
Moscow headquarters complex and buying top-of-the-line corporate jets.
Given the anecdotes we have recounted, and many others that we could
have told instead (the better known ones include Berezovski’s looting of
AvtoVAZ and Aeroflot; Trans World Metals’ tolling agreements with the
Novolipetsk steel mill and all three of Russia’s major aluminum refineries;
Primorski Krai governor Yevgeni Nazdratenko's takeover of Far Eastern
Shipping Co.; and reversal of the Lomonosov Porcelain Factory privatization
after foreign investors bought control and sought to oust the factory’s
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managers),85 one might ask: Are there any honest major companies left in
Russia?
Well, maybe.  Some behave better than others.  LUKOil and
Surgutneftegaz are better respected than other Russian oil companies, and their
shares trade at a higher price per barrel of reserves, though still at a small
fraction of Western prices.  Their managers still steal, just less egregiously.
LUKOil’s managers recently bought 9% of its shares from the government for
a slender $200 million (with funds almost surely obtained by self-dealing);
Surgutneftegaz recently proposed merging its holding company (which held 16
billion shares of its principal producing subsidiary) into the producing subsidiary,
in exchange for 12 billion subsidiary shares—an instant 25% dilution of the
holding company’s minority shareholders.86
But gross misbehavior was the norm.  The new investment that the
privatizers hoped for rarely occurred.  The kleptocrats often reneged on
investment promises that they made when acquiring shares, or that their
companies had made before the kleptocrats acquired them.87  The underlying
question must be: If privatization of even the largest, most valuable firms
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produced outcomes like these, can the alternative have been worse?  We turn
to that question next.88
IV.   THE COUNTERFACTUAL: WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED WITH STAGED
PRIVATIZATION AND MORE INSTITUTION BUILDING?
Some early proponents of rapid privatization of large firms still defend this
strategy; others have backed off.89  The defenders have responded to our
recounting of scandals with two principal assertions.  First, they contend that
massive theft would have occurred if firms hadn’t been privatized.  Second,
they contend that privatization led to productivity gains at some firms.  We
consider these arguments to be only partial responses, for several reasons.
The first step in assessing what might have happened is to define a
counterfactual.  For us, the counterfactual is not just slower privatization of
large firms.  That might have reduced political backlash against market reforms,
but wouldn't have helped the Russian economy much, nor laid the groundwork
for later privatization.  Ukraine, for example, didn’t privatize and is as corrupt
as Russia and in even worse economic shape.  
A more optimistic counterfactual, that we believe was attainable in the early
reform period of 1991-1993, would have included several interrelated steps:
• staging privatization of large firms, while promising managers that their firm
will be privatized if the firm performs well enough to justify privatization
• designing the privatization strategy (for example, enterprise leasing, cash
auctions instead of voucher auctions, and sale of minority stakes to foreign
firms) to produce concentrated instead of dispersed ownership of all but the
largest firms
• devoting the political energy that went into rapid privatization instead to
building the institutions to control self-dealing, corruption, and organized
crime
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• creating a friendlier business climate, especially a friendlier tax regime.
We discuss below why we believe these steps were at least partly attainable.
Some critics have argued to us that our counterfactual overstates the
Russian government’s capacity and honesty, even in the early 1990s.  They
believe that massive theft couldn’t have been prevented, with or without
privatization.90  If they are right, that leaves us with our basic position: If the
government is bad enough, rapid large firm privatization won’t help or hurt the
economy much, compared to available alternatives.  But it will still poison the
political climate against further reform, reinforce corruption, and, as we argue
next, likely facilitate theft at the margin.
A.  Did Large-Firm Privatization Make Self-Dealing Worse?
In Russia and other former Soviet Union countries, much theft from state-
owned companies occurred prior to privatization.  This theft was even given a
polite name—“spontaneous privatization.”  The counterfactual question is
whether theft would have been greater or less if large-firm privatization had
proceeded more slowly, and higher priority had been given to controlling self-
dealing.
We think the theft was likely worse in fact than in our counterfactual.  To
begin with, our counterfactual includes devoting political energy to a full-scale
effort to control self-dealing.  That effort would include prosecuting raw theft
and developing the enforcement institutions needed to attack spontaneous
privatization less crude than simply walking off with the assets.  There was
ample public  support for prosecuting managers who were lining their own
pockets with state assets.  Given the awful state of Russian prisons, it might not
have taken many exemplar cases to turn many managers' risk-reward calculus
toward more honest conduct.
Second, even without this redirection of political energy, there are cases
where theft increased as a result of privatization.  The market price of
Tomskneft, for example, plummeted in 1997 when Yukos acquired a controlling
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stake from the government, evidence that investors expected worse treatment
from Khodorkovski than from the former managers.  By mid-1999, the shares
of Tomskneft, other Yukos subsidiaries, and Yukos itself had lost 98-99% if
their former value. 
Similarly, the ratio of the market price of Noyabrskneftegaz to the price of
its parent, Sibneft, dropped from 100:1 in 1996 to 6:1 in mid-1998 after Sibneft
acquired control, as minority investors incorporated ever-lower expectations
about how much value Sibneft would leave for them.  Sibneft then completed
an exchange offer of four Sibneft shares for each Noyabrskneftegaz share.
Sidanko also looted its subsidiaries, and then was looted itself, with both Sidanko
and its principal subsidiaries ending up in bankruptcy.  Reported earnings tell the
same story.  Tomskneft, Noyabrskneftegaz, and other major enterprises
reported large profits under government ownership, which turned to breakeven
or outright losses after a kleptocrat acquired control.
Third, many privatized enterprises weren’t viable in a competitive market.
For these firms, liquidation was inevitable, but mass privatization still had
pernicious consequences.  Consider an unprofitable firm with assets worth
$1000 in piecemeal liquidation, and worth $1500 if sold to a competitor, who will
close the firm but obtain some value from its customer relationships.  The
government could sell the firm for $1500 in a cash auction.  If the firm isn’t
privatized, its managers will sell its movable assets cheaply to an intermediary,
earning perhaps $500.  If the firm is mass privatized, the controllers, who may
own only 10% of the firm's shares, will strip its assets as best they can.  They
will realize $1000 from piecemeal liquidation, and perhaps another $1000 in
wealth transfers from employees who work but don't receive wages, suppliers
who deliver goods but don't get paid, and customers who receive defective
merchandise and have no recourse. 
Fourth, if natural resource enterprises remained under government
ownership, the current profits could be stolen, but the remaining resources could
be recovered by a future honest government.  With privatization at knock-down
prices, not only the short-term flow, but the full long-term stock, was stolen.
Fifth, control mechanisms under government ownership were weak, but still
likely stronger than after privatization.  Company managers still faced a chain
of command to whom they reported.  Gross theft might upset one’s superiors.
There was also possible embarrassment or even a jail term if theft became
obvious and was publicly reported.
The theoretical case for privatization rests in part on removing enterprises
from political oversight, so that managers' decisions are motivated by profit, not
by whatever motivates politicians.  As Shleifer & Vishny argue, "privatization
widens the separation between the manager and the politician, and in this way
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stimulates restructuring."91  But that same freedom from state control that
facilitates restructuring also facilitates theft, if the manager wants to steal.
Indeed, it’s hard to see how one could construct a theoretical model in
which privatization promotes restructuring by freeing firms from state control,
in which that diminished control does not also permit increased self-dealing.  To
prevent increased theft, the state would have to devote specialized resources
(prosecutors, a strong Securities Commission) to controlling self-dealing.  Russia
didn't take these steps initially, and once managers and kleptocrats became
strong, they opposed controls on self-dealing.  The kleptocracy became self-
reinforcing.
Moreover, the Russian government would be financially stronger today if
it still owned Russia’s major natural resources companies.  Oil and gas revenues
alone would easily cover its foreign debt service and pension and salary
obligations.  And there would be strong political pressure to use those revenues
for these purposes.
B.  The Efficiency and Distributional Consequences of Privatization
Dirty privatization might be justified if it accelerated the restructuring of
inefficient state-owned enterprises.  Unfortunately, there is little evidence of
this.  Russian productivity fell sharply during the 1990s.  The productivity of the
average Russian worker fell from 30% of the U.S. level in 1992 to only 19% in
1999.  Capital investment has plunged as well, to only 13% of GDP (40% of the
pre-1992 level).92
In many countries, case-by-case privatization of state-owned firms, often
natural resources firms or monopolies like railroads, telephone, and electric
utilities, increased productivity.93  But evidence on post-privatization efficiency
gains in Russia and other former Soviet Union countries that pursued mass
privatization is mixed.  As John Nellis concludes in a recent survey:
Evidence—early  and fragmentary, but impossible  to ignore—from . . . Armenia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, and
Ukraine—shows less promising results:
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• Private ownership often does not lead to restructuring . . . .
• Some partially state-owned firms perform better than privatized firms.
• In some  countries, there  are few differences  in performance between
(wholly) state-owned and privately owned firms.
• In other countries, there are clear performance improvements only  in those
very few firms sold to foreign investors.94
The culprit appears to be, in part, the diffuse ownership created by voucher
privatization.  Diffuse ownership is associated with less restructuring than any
other form of firm ownership, including continued state ownership.95 
The evidence doesn’t suggest that privatized companies perform worse than
state-owned companies, on average.  They merely don’t perform much better,
if at all.  But that in itself is damning.  Enormous political energy was devoted
to large-firm privatization, which was seen as a key to economic revival.  Ex
post, the efficiency gains are so small that economists are debating whether
they exist at all.  The outcome suggests that political energy might have been
better spent elsewhere.
Moreover, we often measure efficiency in terms of the size of the social
pie, without regard to who owns which slice.  That’s too simple in Russia.  One
Russian tragedy is that wealth differences soared while the social pie was
shrinking.  Russia’s per capita GDP declined by 40% in the 1990s, while a
standard measure of inequality, the Gini coefficient, soared from around 24 in
1988 to 47 in 1997 (compared to a U.S. level of about 43).  The rising Gini
coefficient tells us that the bottom half of the Russian population faced an
income decline far greater than the 40% average decline.  The percentage of
Russians living in absolute poverty (by standard measures) grew from a small
fraction of the population in 1989 to an estimated 55 million (37% of the
population) in 1999.96  The billions held offshore by a few kleptocrats have far
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less social value than the same amount distributed broadly among the Russian
population.
Privatization doesn’t have to be all or none.  Our judgment is that Russia’s
privatization of small shops and businesses (basically given to their employees)
was a positive step.  Mass privatization of medium and larger enterprises was
neither a clearly good nor a clearly bad step.   It produced many viable
companies and some decent owners, though with a tendency for bad owners to
buy or squeeze out good ones.  But loans-for-shares and other rigged sales of
the largest enterprises were a failure both economically and politically.  They
produced bad owners who chose asset stripping over value creation, almost
without exception. 
C.  Institution Building
Section B addressed whether rapid large-firm privatization is likely to
produce productivity gains compared to continued state ownership, holding
constant the (bad) institutional environment.  However, our counterfactual does
not hold constant the institutional environment.  Instead, it assumes that the
political energy devoted to privatization goes instead into building the institutions
to support privatization. 
There’s no way to know by how much better laws and institutions could
have reduced self-dealing, had they preceded or at least accompanied
privatization.  Good tax laws, a serious anti-corruption program, and credible
enforcement against insider theft of company assets might have made a major
difference.  Good (and sometimes enforced) capital markets laws might have
helped to establish baseline expectations about behavior.  Conversely, their early
absence contributed to a lawless climate, in which managers could justify self-
dealing by claiming (sometimes correctly) that they had done nothing illegal.
Perhaps enforcement of capital markets rules would have been equally
minimal if the rules and regulators had come first.  Or perhaps Russia would
have found a different path-dependent equilibrium, with better and more
vigorously enforced capital markets laws, had good laws and a strong securities
commission preceded privatization.  We cannot say.  What we can say is that
bad owners reinforce corruption and create pressure for weak enforcement,
and this pressure contributed to the non-enforcement of capital markets laws
that is the norm today.97 
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At the margin, stronger controls on skimming would have reduced the
expected return to skimming, while improving the firm's expected long-term
value (because the same government that was building stronger institutions was
less likely to expropriate that value).  That would have changed at least some
managers' decisions to skim instead of build value.
D.  Staged Privatization: Enterprise Leasing and Alternatives
Our counterfactual also assumes a program of staged privatization, in
which companies whose managers have proven both the company’s viability
and their own honesty are privatized first, and privatization is designed to
produce concentrated rather than dispersed ownership. These steps would have
reduced the likelihood that enterprise controllers would strip them rather than
build value; would have given the enforcers a less overwhelming task; and
would have facilitated the virtuous cycle that the privatizers hoped for, in which
managers of privatized enterprises support good and enforced commercial and
capital markets laws, and their mostly good behavior establishes norms for
manager conduct.  
Staged privatization can produce value-creation incentives similar to
immediate privatization.  If the government promises managers that their firm
will be privatized if the firm’s results justify this, that promise of future wealth
can provide incentives similar to those created by immediate privatization,
without the loss of state control over self-dealing that privatization entails.98
Such a promise won't be fully credible, but semi-credible promises could have
been made, and were being made, prior to mass privatization.  For example,
that the government could reserve a percentage of the company's shares for its
managers.  The expectation of receiving shares in the future can create
incentives similar to restricted stock or stock options that vest over time, which
are commonly used as incentive compensation in developed economies.
For us, staged privatization has four key features:
• The promise of future  privatization, contingent on performance, can create
profit incentives comparable to those created by immediate privatization.
• Bureaucratic  controls  are loosened first on operating decisions, and only  later
on self-dealing, as  the infrastructure  to control self-dealing within  fully private
enterprises is created.
• Privatization is  designed to produce concentrated ownership of all but the
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larges t firms, to reduce controllers’ incentives  to expropriate minority
shareholders.
• If only successful, honestly run enterprises are privatized, a virtuous spiral
that encourages good managerial behavior can emerge, instead of the
downward  spiral that resulted from mass privatization without controls  on self-
dealing.
Staged privatization would not have been perfectly clean.  Some companies
would have been privatized as a result of bribery rather than performance.  But
the tilt would still have been toward privatizing the more successful firms first.
1.  Enterprise Leasing
A promise of future privatization of profitable firms could take many forms.
But we need not speculate on its exact form because such promises were being
made during the perestroika era, through a program called “enterprise leasing”
that began in 1989.  The privatizers killed enterprise leasing in 1992, so we don't
know how it would have turned out.  But we know how it started, and the start
was promising.99
Enterprise leasing involved a contract between the state, as enterprise
owner, and the enterprise or its labor collective.  The lease contract promised
the enterprise greater freedom to make investment and operating decisions, pay
higher wages, and retain profits, and the potential to eventually buy ownership
of the enterprise from the state—all conditioned on the enterprise producing
profits that could be reinvested, used to pay higher wages, or saved toward an
eventual buyout.
This scheme created complex but promising incentives and information-
revelation mechanisms.  The incentives were similar to those created by
leveraged buyouts (an analogy that the privatizers missed).  Saved profits were
the only funds that could be used for an eventual buyout, so there was a
powerful incentive to run the firm efficiently and not to squander profits through
higher wages.  Conversely, managers that didn't generate (and then save)
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enough profits to buy their own firm faced the risk that the state would replace
them or sell the firm to outside owners.
The firm's accounts were open to its workers, who could therefore watch
the managers.  The workers had incentives to monitor the managers, lest the
managers pay high salaries to themselves or skim profits.  The workers could
police self-dealing by complaining through the existing administrative chain of
command.  Managers, in turn, knew that they could be fired or jailed, or
privatization could be withheld, if they ran the enterprise crookedly.
Privatization, then, would be available to those managers who proved their
skill by earning profits and proved their honesty by not self-dealing.  A
managerial culture of honesty would be reinforced.  The state, meanwhile, could
collect a fraction of the reported profits as taxes. Managers who hid profits
would also deprive themselves of the chance for a future buyout.  And the state
would have a strong incentive to honor the privatization promise when the time
came.  Privatization would raise revenue today while still promising tax revenue
down the road.  With a respectable tax base in place and privatization revenue
also flowing in, the government would have been less inclined to turn to
draconian tax rules in a desperate attempt to raise revenue.  Slower privatization
of large enterprises would also have given Russia time to develop a better
infrastructure to police self-dealing when full privatization occurred. 
The early returns from enterprise leasing were positive.  It began in 1990,
based on an April 1989 decree and a November 1989 law,100 and soon proved
highly popular with managers and workers.  Enterprises that entered the leasing
program—self-selected to be sure—often did well.  By early 1992, about 9,500
leased enterprises accounted for 8% of total Russian employment and 13% of
industrial production.  The privatizers then shut down the leasing programs, lest
too many profitable firms choose leasing and be unavailable to be privatized.
Some nuances of the choice between staged and immediate privatization:
First, some firms could become profitable only under new management.
Enterprise leasing wouldn't directly lead to replacement of the old managers.
But mass privatization as actually carried out, with control given to workers and
managers, also produced only limited managerial turnover.  The turnover that
occurred wasn’t always for the better; sometimes bad owners ousted or
coopted honest managers.  Moreover, with leasing, the state retained the power
to install new managers or to sell unsuccessful enterprises to new owners.
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Second, enterprise leasing won't work for nonviable enterprises.  For these
enterprises, the managers' best option will be to skim what they can while they
can.  But for these enterprises, privatization only accelerated the plunder by
loosening bureaucratic controls on theft from state-owned enterprises.  The
government could more usefully have retained ownership of nonviable
enterprises; not subsidized them further, and ideally supervised their liquidation.
Third, for Russia's huge natural resources and utility companies, leasing
would have openly conveyed too much wealth to a few lucky managers to be
politically feasible.  Honest privatization auctions might have been preferable.
But even for these enterprises, leasing would likely have been better than the
dirty privatization that actually took place.
It’s ironic  that the Russian Communists of a decade ago, knowing that
central planning was a dead end but not fully trusting markets either, likely built
through enterprise leasing a better means to manage privatization than the
privatize-now approach that Western advisors later promoted and Russian
reformers enthusiastically followed.  The Russians who blame Western advice
for destroying their economy are not entirely wrong.
2.  Other Approaches to Staged Privatization
Enterprise leasing is only one example of a staged privatization strategy.
We discuss below several other approaches to privatization that are consistent
with this overall approach.
Cash Auctions.  Enterprise leasing is one way to sell enterprises for
cash—where the current managers are the only permitted bidders and can pay
only with the firm’s own accumulated profits.  Another way is cash auctions,
designed to produce concentrated ownership.  A realistic reservation price can
segregate viable from nonviable firms, and ensure that insiders don’t steal viable
firms for a small fraction of true value.  Firms for which no one bids the
reservation price can be left in state hands, where controls on theft are likely to
be stronger.  The government can still give their managers incentives to build
value by promising to sell their enterprise if its prospects improve, as well as
incentives to pursue an orderly liquidation if that is the best alternative.
Russians had enough wealth to make cash auctions viable.  At the start of
the 1990s, they held about $100 billion in savings accounts.  The government
froze these savings accounts and then inflated the currency, wiping out almost
all of their value before they were unfrozen.  Once the savings were gone, only
crooks and the nomenklatura had the money to buy large enterprises.  But cash
auctions were feasible ex ante.
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Privatizing Leveraged Companies.  Russia privatized companies free of
debts to the government.  Having firms issue debt to the government as part of
privatization could have ensured a realistic  minimum price when the companies
were sold in cash auctions, because the government’s net receipt would be the
payment for the equity plus the present value of the debt.  By reducing the
firm’s equity value, it would reduce the amount that the managers could
expropriate from minority shareholders.  And, if the government were willing
to promptly seize and resell firms that defaulted on their debt payments, this
would give managers incentives to generate enough cash to make those
payments.101
Two caveats: First, selling leveraged companies is a form of seller-financing
that enables the buyers to leverage their limited cash.  That’s valuable as an
antidote to limited citizen funds, but also dangerous, because leverage creates
asset-stripping incentives not too dissimilar from partial equity ownership.  So
leverage makes sense only for clearly viable firms, and the debt should be
limited to a moderate percentage of firm value.  Second, either control must
automatically revert to the state if the debt isn’t paid,102 or the government must
have both the means and the will to quickly seize companies that don’t pay their
debts (the Russian government lacked the will for tax debts), or the strategy will
collapse.
Selling Minority Stakes to Foreign Firms.  For Russia’s very large
natural resources companies, domestic  sales for cash weren’t feasible.  There
wasn’t enough cash around to pay more than a fraction of their value, and the
largest cash hoards were often obtained in dubious ways.  Selling controlling
stakes to foreigners was a political nonstarter.  But it might have been politically
possible to sell to a foreign firm a significant minority stake in, say, a
government-owned oil company, with the expectation that the foreign firm
would manage the company in the near term, would coinvest in new projects,
and the government would sell its remaining stake through a public offering a
few years hence, once the Russian securities market had developed enough to
make that a viable option.103 
At the same time, foreign ownership is no panacea.  The wrong foreigners
can strip assets too.  A corrupt government that can’t conduct honest auctions
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or control self-dealing isn't likely to do a good job of screening investors,
domestic or foreign.
E.  The Political Consequences of Dirty Privatization
Russians themselves do not distinguish sharply between voucher
privatization (in which most received worthless shares) and the corrupt sales of
the largest enterprises.  Both have led to popular distrust of privatization and a
market economy.  This distrust has already slowed other market reforms and
will affect future reforms for decades to come.  That’s a heavy price to pay for
the uncertain economic benefits of fast privatization.
Even if insiders would loot privatized and state-owned firms equally, the
political consequences are very different if the theft occurs within government
ownership, rather than after privatization.  In the former case, the public
associates managers’ theft of assets with continued state ownership.  The
political case for eventual privatization becomes stronger and is coupled with
political pressure to control self-dealing.  In the latter case, the political case for
market reforms is undermined, as the public associates privatization with theft
of company assets, and company insiders become potent opponents of efforts
to control them.  
An important political goal of voucher privatization was to build popular
support for privatization by distributing share ownership broadly.  What irony
that the exact opposite happened!  Conversely, staged privatization, starting with
successful firms, could have given privatization a good name, encouraging future
reform efforts.104
In addition, one hoped-for consequence of privatization was faster
restructuring of major enterprises.  Restructuring through new management or
new investment was the exception.  But restructuring through layoffs, wage
arrears, and shedding of social obligations to maintain housing, kindergartens,
medical clinics and the like was common.
The shedding of excess costs was inevitable.  It might have been politically
acceptable if the government had provided the social services that enterprises
were shedding, plus some unemployment, retraining, and relocation benefits,
especially in company towns where new jobs were scarce.  The social
consequences would have been milder if the business climate had been
friendlier, so that more laid off workers could land jobs at newly created firms.
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Without these ameliorating factors, shedding of social obligations led to a large
increase in seriously poor people, a sharp increase in death rates, and political
unhappiness with market reforms.
The privatizers sometimes offer a political defense of the corrupt sales of
Russia’s major firms: The kleptocrats used their wealth and media outlets to buy
Yeltsin’s reelection as President in 1996.  Otherwise, the Communists would
have returned to power.  We aren’t persuaded by this “better crooks than
Communists” argument.  First, the poisonous mix of corruption, dirty
privatization, rampant self-dealing, and Mafia-government ties was a major
reason why Yeltsin was desperately unpopular and hence a Communist victory
was a serious risk.  Better policies might have let Yeltsin (or another reform or
center candidate) win easily.  Second, by 1999, as it became apparent that the
kleptocrats virtually owned the Kremlin, it was no longer so clear that Zyuganov
would have been a worse leader than a sick, ineffectual, corruption-tolerating
Yeltsin.
F.  Toward A Friendlier Business Climate
The final and perhaps most challenging part of our counterfactual involves
creating a friendlier overall business climate.  Creating a friendly business
climate is a complex task; we list here only a few politically viable steps.  But
here are several plausible steps.  Our goal  is to suggest some steps that could
have improved the business climate if given high priority.
Political attention is a scarce resource.  The reformers focused on rapid
large-firm privatization, and thus foreclosed the opportunity to accomplish much
along other lines.
One step would have been to waive enterprise-level income taxes on
businesses below a certain size, such as 1000 employees.  The actual
confiscatory taxes that Russia levies are hugely counterproductive.  They raise
negligible revenue, promote corruption, drive small businesses underground and
sometimes out of business, and force businesses to hide their profits (which
promotes skimming).
Even rich countries have little success collecting income taxes from small
businesses.  The United States recently gave up and now allows non-public
firms to pass through all profits and losses to their owners, without firm-level
income tax.  If the United States can't collect these taxes, Russia would have
done better not to try.  Eliminating income taxes on small businesses has an
obvious constituency and would have been politically feasible if tried.
A sec ond critical step would have been to attack corruption and organized
crime.  If an aggressive attack on corruption had been a top priority for internal
reformers and a key condition for outside financial aid, the attack might have
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been launched and would likely have been partly successful.   Such an effort is
harder today because corruption is more deeply entrenched and many privatized
businesses support the corrupt status quo.  The political viability of an attack on
corruption and the Mafia is not in doubt, only the political will to carry it out.
An attack on bureaucratic  interference and on the sheer size of the
bureaucracy would have helped.  So would privatization of urban land.  Local
governments often use their control of land to limit new entry in many markets.
V.  INSIDER SELF-DEALING IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
The Czech Republic  offers an interesting comparison to Russia that can
help isolate which aspects of the Russian experience with rapid mass
privatization were unique to Russia, and which may reflect deeper problems that
arise when privatization precedes development of legal and institutional controls
on self-dealing.
The Czech Republic  was the first formerly Communist country to plunge
into voucher privatization, through auctions that took place in two stages, in
1991-1992 and 1993-1994.  By 1994, over 2,000 state-owned firms had been
privatized through the voucher program; around 500 voucher investment funds
had emerged to collect vouchers and invest in privatized firms; most of Czech
industry was in private hands; competing stock markets had emerged; and the
Czech economy was growing briskly, with rapid formation of new businesses
and low unemployment.  As late as 1996, the Czech Republic  seemed to be “the
success story of Eastern European mass privatization.”105
Today, no one is so sanguine.  The early Czech stock market success was
replaced by a scramble for control of privatized enterprises; stock prices that
collapse once control is attained; and insider looting of many privatized
companies and voucher investment funds.  The Czechs invented their own
term—tunneling—for the widespread practice of selling a company's products
at below-market prices to an intermediary owned by the company's managers,
to be resold at market price.  As a result, the Czech Republic plunged into
recession in 1997 and 1998, while neighboring Poland and Hungary, which were
slower to privatize large firms but built better controls on self-dealing, continued
to expand briskly.
A.  The Czech Experience with Tunneling
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Czech mass privatization sparked the emergence of voucher investment
funds, which collected vouchers from citizens and invested in the companies
that were being privatized.  The voucher investment funds often took sizeable
stakes in a limited number of firms, enough to give them influence and
sometimes control.  This seemed at first to be encourage restructuring.  When
holdover management couldn't make the transition to a market economy, the
funds could install new managers.  There was, however, concern that the not-
yet-privatized Czech banks, who owned some of the largest investment funds,
would use their equity stakes to cement lending relationships, rather than to
promote restructuring.106
The bank-run investment funds indeed didn't generate much restructuring.
But that was the good news.  A retrospective analysis by the Czech Ministry
of Finance found a negative correlation between post-privatization firm
performance and the percentage of shares held by non-bank voucher
investment funds.  The principal reason was that the voucher investment funds
used their influence not to restructure firms, but to tunnel away the firms’
profits.107  
As scandals proliferated, foreign investors withdrew—net foreign direct and
portfolio investment dropped from $103 million in 1995 to $57 million in 1996 and
turned negative in 1997.  And the Czech stock market imploded.  Total listed
companies dropped from a peak of around 1700 in 1994 to 283 at year-end
1998.  The number of companies on the “main exchange,” the only one with
significant  liquidity, dropped from 62 in 1995 to 10 in 1998.  And there has not
yet been a single Czech IPO.
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The minimal regulation of investment funds, companies, and securities
markets was by design.  The Czech government was dominated by fervent
free-marketeers who believed that market participants would largely regulate
themselves.108  They were simply wrong.  The scams that quickly developed
offer a tutorial in the ways that fraudsters can extract value from both
companies and investment funds.  A Czech Ministry of Finance report identified
fifteen common techniques:109
• the interconnection of several companies —especially  investment companies,
investment funds and securit ies dealers, pension funds, banks and other
companies.  These interconnections are informal, hard to identify, and utilize
puppets.
• large conventional fines—conventional fines are  agreed on in agreements  on
securities  transfer, the amount often being a multiple  of the value of the agreed
deal . . . . Simultaneously, failure to comply with conditions is ensured by the
above interconnection of persons in the contracting parties.
• purchases of worthless shares —persons controlling investment companies
or investment funds found a normal joint-stock company, whose shares  are
b ased on worthless property (e.g. receivables, know-how) and the n  t h e s e
shares are purchased [by the] investment fund or unit trust.
• concluding unfavourable options and futures  contracts —such agreements
do not cover the [market price] risks associated with . . . [the] securities  held
by the investment fund or unit trust [that are subject to the option or futures
contract] . . . . 
• transfer of advances  for the purchase of securities—the investment company
or investment fund transfers [funds to] . . . a securities dealer; this cash is not
subject to payment of interest by the dealer . . . ; the dealer makes use of this
money for dealing in his own name and . . .  [may have] negligible assets . . . .
• long settlement periods for securities  sold—an investment company sells
securities. . . . and sets a [very] long settlement period. . . . In the meantime the
company owing the money declares bankruptcy and is liquidated.
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• loans of securities— . . . [S]ecurities  are loaned from the assets of an
investment fund or a unit trust without any guarantees and even without any
payment for the loan.
• poorly  drawn-up agreements  on the transfer of securities —the agreements
do not cover basic obligations, such as the date of supply of the security [or
the] date of settlement of advances for the purchase of the securities . . . . 
• irrational movements of securities —there  are entire  chains of trades  in a
single  type of security; over a few days or weeks or even months, the
respective security is  owned by a whole series of companies and then returns
to the fund at an entirely different price than that when it left. . . .
• trading in securities  at ridiculous prices—such operations can be carried out
especially  because there  is  no objectively determinable price for most
securities as  the price-creating function of the public market fails to operate.
. . .  [Czech law] prohibits funds from loaning money from their assets to other
(i.e. third) parties.  Funds evade this restriction by concluding an agreement on
the sale of securities from their assets  to some  other legal entity, usually an
associated one, at a very low price.  A verbal agreement is  then made that this
associated person will sell the securities back to the fund after a certain  period
of time, again at a very low price. . . .
• disadvantageous purchases and sales of securities — . . . [funds may
purchase new issues  of a company's shares] for large sums  while these shares
can be purchased on the market at much lower prices. . . .
• trading by management on its own account—these practices  . . . [are]
associated with the misuse of confidential information, obtained on Boards or
Directors of joint-stock companies, whose shares  are part of the assets of the
fund; this information is supplied to the [fund’s] management, employees, or
relatives, or the [company's] shares are sold to such persons at low prices. . .
.
• concentration of considerable  amounts  of cash in the accounts  of investment
funds or unit trusts in banks.  This method formed the basis for subsequent
“tunneling” into unit  trusts managed by the CS Fund, . . . [which] gradually
sold  securities  from the assets  of the unit trust and when the entire  assets  were
transferred in  the form of deposits  to a bank, the deposits were withdrawn and
transferred to an account abroad. . . .
• failure to comply with limits for restricting and spreading risks—[Czech law]
sets forth limits for holding securities  [of a single  issuer] in relation to the total
volume of assets  owned by an investment fund or unit trust . . . .  Cases have
been registered in which investment funds . . . exceeded the limits for
restricting and spreading risks . . . .  Simultaneously, the [companies] whose
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shares were owned by the funds encountered difficulties, . . . their shares fell
to zero value and the investment funds often suffered considerable  losses. . .
.
• “tunneling” into companies is a frequent phenomenon—current “corporate
raiders” have discovered a risk-free method of removing money from
companies.  This method consists of holding a general meeting of
shareholders, in which the “raiders” have a voting majority; this meeting
passes a decision on a transaction involving company property . . .  and the
Board  of Directors of the company then carries out this operation, with
consequent damage to the company.  No (minority) shareholder can blame the
Board  of Directors  of the company for this operation as it is bound by the
decision of the general meeting . . . .
These ways of “handling” the assets of investment funds and unit trusts are
combined in practice and are very difficult to demonstrate and penalize.
The ardent free-marketeers who resisted calls to regulate Czech capital
markets may have been sincere in the beginning.  But by the late 1990s, many
had been bought, as company managers turned to bribery to ward off regulation
or prosecution.  The Klaus government fiercely resisted calls for an anti-
corruption probe; Klaus himself simply denied (against all evidence) that the
Czech Republic had a problem with corruption or tunneling.110 
The Czech Republic, unlike Russia, responded to the scandals.  A
corruption scandal brought down the Klaus government in 1997; a Securities
Commission, which Klaus had long opposed, was installed the same year; the
new government launched an anti-corruption drive which has been at least a
partial success; and legal controls on investment funds and majority
shareholders were tightened.  Much remains to be done, but these efforts give
hope of improved long-term performance.  Still, for now, the government is
shutting the barn door after many valuable horses have been removed and much
harm has been done to the economy.
B.  Comparing Russia and the Czech Republic
The Czech Republic privatized without controls on self-dealing, but
otherwise provided a reasonably good business environment.  It had been
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Communist for only about forty years, not seventy-five like Russia; its economy
wasn’t as thoroughly distorted by central planning; memories of how to run a
private business survived; it was close to export markets in Western Europe;
and many Czech firms faced strong import competition.
That not-so-bad environment was sufficient to nourish self-dealing.  One
central reason:  The shares of a mass-privatized company were worth more to
crooks, who would use 50% control to extract 100% of value, than to honest
owners who would run the company for the benefit of all shareholders.  At the
same time, the Czech Republic's friendlier business climate meant that for
insiders, looting was sometimes less attractive than building long-term value or
selling to someone else who would do so.  In Russia, theft of company assets
became the norm; in the Czech Republic, it merely became distressingly
common.
Still, the many Czech cases where insiders skimmed from viable enterprises,
instead of restructuring them, demonstrate—as the Russia example alone
cannot—that strong controls on self-dealing are a necessary precondition for
successful large-firm privatization.  In neither country did many entrepreneurs
both run the business to maximize long-term profit and skim profits in the near
term.  In the Czech Republic, that may reflect looters’ assigning a low weight
to the firm’s long-term value, given the risk that a future government will
investigate their near-term theft.
The Klaus government turned, between 1992 and 1997, from a collection
of apparently honest free-market ideologues into corrupt opponents of
restrictions on tunneling.  Proposed regulations and proposed indictments of the
tunnelers were routinely quashed.  A (second hand, so unverifiable) story from
a Finance Ministry official : The Ministry staff’s record in getting Klaus and
other senior officials to approve criminal cases against tunnelers was 0/26. In
the Czech Republic, as in Russia, privatization without controls on self-dealing
fostered corruption, as the self-dealers bought government officials, both to
permit continued self-dealing and to ward off prosecution.
Growth in labor productivity offers a good measure of a country’s overall
success in privatization and transition policy.  Table III shows the striking
contrasts between Hungary and Poland, which stumbled into something
resembling our staged privatization/institution building proposal; the Czech
Republic, which had the capacity to do likewise but pursued mass privatization
instead; and Russia, which started from a worse place and pursued mass
privatization.
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Table III
Labor Productivity in Selected Transition Countries, 1989-1998





Source: ECONOMIC COMM’N FOR EUR., ECONOMIC SURVEY OF EUROPE 1999 NO.
3 (1999)
C.  The Special Case of Voucher Investment Funds
In both Russia and the Czech Republic, the privatizers hoped that voucher
investment funds would become strong outside owners, who could replace bad
managers and force restructuring of enterprises.  That sometimes happened, but
more often, the voucher investment funds were part of the problem, not the
solution.  Too often, they looted the companies they invested in and were looted
themselves.  Roughly a quarter of Czech investment funds were looted so
thoroughly that they went bankrupt; another quarter were converted into
unregulated holding companies, with likely adverse consequences for their
minority investors. In Russia, too, many investment funds simply disappeared,
and their assets were never traced.  
Our theoretical analysis in Part III.A of an amoral controller's choice
between value creation and self-dealing can help to explain why.  First, fund
controllers hold only a modest fraction of the cash flow rights (through their
management fee).  Second, a value creating strategy is most likely to maximize
the controller's private value for a company with strong growth prospects.  For
voucher investment funds, growth prospects are limited.  They receive a one-
shot infusion of capital at the time of voucher privatization, that won't be
replicated through private investment for a long time, if ever.111  This virtually
ensures that if self-dealing isn't policed, an amoral controller will be better off
stealing the fund's value than keeping a partial claim on that value through
management fees.  All the more so if the fund can first tunnel into operating
companies that it controls.112
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reasons why voucher funds weren’t a promising source of restructuring effort).
The incentive to loot created by the separation of ownership and control at
the fund level is exacerbated at the level of the companies that the fund invests
in.  Investment fund control of operating companies is a pyramid structure under
another name.  Suppose that the fund manager collects an annual fee equal to
2% of assets.  That might represent, in present value, a claim on 15% of the
fund’s value.  If the fund owns 20% of an operating company, the fund
manager’s claim on the operating company’s value is a scant 15% • 20% = 3%.
The smaller that percentage claim, the more attractive looting becomes.113
Just as crooks can outbid honest owners for control of operating companies,
making dispersed ownership unstable if self-dealing is easy, so too for
investment funds.  An example: The Austrian bank Creditanstalt sponsored a
major Czech investment fund.  But Czech citizens who though they were safe
entrusting funds to Creditanstalt soon discovered otherwise.  Motoinvest bought
11% of the fund’s shares in the market, called a special shareholder meeting,
replaced Creditanstalt as manager, and proceeded to loot the fund.114
It also was never realistic  to expect even honest fund managers to devote
much attention to restructuring portfolio firms.  The same pyramid structure that
creates incentives to loot creates disincentives to pursue restructuring: the fund
manager will realize only a small fraction of the resulting gains in company
value.  Nor were voucher funds a source of the new capital that many firms
needed.115
D.  A Czech Counterfactual: Mass Privatization with Institution Building
The Czech Republic’s chose to privatize in a hurry, and not to build
institutions to control self-dealing. That hands-off policy gave the tunnelers a
six-year head start; the regulators have not yet caught up.  A difficult
counterfactual: What if the Czech Republic had vigorously pursued both mass
privatization and institution building?
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Our own judgment: The tunnelers would still have largely outrun the
regulators.  In the early 1990s, Czech regulators and prosecutors were
completely inexperienced in how to regulate capital markets or control self-
dealing.  Czech courts were and remain overloaded and unsophisticated.
Neither could deal with the misdeeds of the controllers of thousands of
enterprises and voucher funds.  Mass privatization, even with coupled with an
immediate effort to build these and other needed institutions, would have given
the crooks a critical head start.  The crooks would then have used the funds
generated by that head start to compromise the regulators, ensuring that the
government wouldn’t run too fast to catch up.116
VI.  IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PRIVATIZATION EFFORTS
Mass privatization was motivated, in important respects, by faith.  As
Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, key Western advisers on Russian
privatization, wrote as recently as 1998:
W e believe that managerial discretion problems are usually  minor relative to
political discretion problems.  Privatization works because it controls political
discretion.117
For Russia, we once shared that belief.118  So did the Western advisors who
pushed the Czech Republic, Russia, and many other countries to plunge ahead
with mass privatization.  But they and we were wrong.  The faith that any
private owner was better than state ownership rested on an unexamined
premise—that a country has the will and infrastructure to control managerial
discretion manifested through overt self-dealing.   If the state cannot control this
form of white-collar crime, then the balance between the problems of
managerial discretion and political discretion is uncertain.
We have learned that Western-style capitalism is more fragile than we
thought.  It will not emerge—certainly not quickly, perhaps not at all—if seeds
are simply scattered widely through mass privatization, to grow in the thin soil
of an institutionally impoverished country.  Instead, the institutions that control
theft in its myriad forms, especially self-dealing by managers and controlling
shareholders, are an essential fertilizer.
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119 Black (2000), supra note 6, discusses the institutions that underlie strong securities markets.
The task of creating fertile soil in which privatized companies can take root
is not a simple one.  We don't yet know how strong the infrastructure must be
before large-firm privatization is likely to significantly promote economic growth.
Moreover, many of the necessary institutions can develop only as the market
develops.  The securities commission and criminal prosecutors need fraud to
practice on, if they are to become skilled at combating fraud.  Accountants,
investment bankers, and other reputational intermediaries also learn from their
mistakes—from the frauds they didn't catch.
What we do know is discouraging.  The necessary tasks can’t be completed
quickly.  Controlling corruption is essential, but not enough.  Ironically, the
countries that have made the worst hash of managing their state-owned
enterprises are least likely to possess the institutions that would let them gain
from rapidly privatizing large firms.119 
A.  Steps Toward Successful Large-Firm Privatization
What then should a country with weak institutions do, with its not-yet-
privatized firms or its already privatized firms?  For not-yet-privatized firms, the
counterfactual that we offered in Part IV, including attacking corruption,
building institutions to control self-dealing, staged privatization, and a
privatization plan that produces concentrated rather than dispersed ownership
where feasible, offers a guide on how one might proceed.
For both already privatized and not-yet-privatized firms, Russia needs a
serious, top-down effort to control corruption, organized crime, and self-dealing;
adopt a rational tax system; reduce the broad administrative discretion that
invites corruption; shrink the bloated bureaucracy; enforce existing rules that
limit self-dealing; remove the principal loopholes in those rules; and improve
financial reporting by major firms (which isn’t feasible until the tax system
permits firms to report results honestly).  The relevant “top” could be a central
government or a regional government.  No one of these steps is sufficient by
itself, but each will help and progress on any one can reinforce progress on
others.
No sensible person could be against these changes, and many Russians
understand their importance.  But none is yet at the top of the Russian
government’s agenda.  They need to be.  Otherwise, Russia risks going the way
of Nigeria—another oil-rich country whose government is thoroughly corrupt
and its population impoverished, while a favored few skim billions into offshore
accounts.  There’s hope that Russia’s new President, Vladimir Putin, will mount
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a serious attack on corruption, but as yet no solid evidence that he will do so.
His public  anti-corruption, anti-kleptocrat rhetoric  hasn’t thus far been matched
by his behind-the-scenes actions.120
B.  The Case for Selective Renationalization and Reprivatization
For already privatized firms with bad owners, there are no easy solutions,
but here is one unconventional proposal.  Western advisors are reluctant to
propose renationalization as a remedy, no matter how corrupt the initial
privatization.  In contrast, we see possible merit in selective renationalization,
followed promptly by reprivatization.  When—and only when—the government
develops the will and ability to reprivatize promptly and honestly, it could make
sense to both prosecute corporate thieves and renationalize companies that
were, for all practical purposes, stolen.
The case for renationalization and reprivatization will depend on company-
specific misdeeds that justify this remedy.  Here are two examples.  Suppose
that Mikhail Khodorkovski transfers all value from Yukos and its subsidiaries to
shadowy offshore companies.  Renationalization and reprivatization would harm
no one but Khodorkovski and his accomplices, could produce better owners who
will pay workers, pay taxes, and invest in Yukos’ oil fields, and raise serious
revenue for the government.  A reprivatization auction that raised 20% of the
value of a comparably sized Western firm could raise $35 billion, which exceeds
the government's current annual tax revenue.  Similarly, renationalization of
Zarubezhtsvetmet would harm only its current crooked owners, benefit the
Erdenet copper mine and the entire country of Mongolia, and permit Russia to
earn the revenue from privatization that it should have earned the first time.
The appropriate analogy is to thieves who steal government property.  The
government’s appropriate response is put the thieves in jail (unless they flee the
country first) and seize and resell their ill-gotten property.  As long as the
government seizes property only from thieves, we shouldn’t worry too much
that honest owners will be scared off from investing, lest the government treat
them the same way.
Indeed, the anti-renationalization advice now proffered by the multilateral
institutions is internally inconsistent.  The IMF and the World Bank are
encouraging governments around the world to seize insolvent financial
institutions (often made so by bad loans to insiders).  They have missed the
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analogy between seizing a financial institution that has been stripped by insiders
and seizing a nonfinancial institution that has been stripped by insiders.
We propose renationalization plus prompt reprivatization, when and only
when the government can do a better job both in reprivatizing and in controlling
insider self-dealing.121  We have no opinion on whether renationalization without
privatization could make sense.  That depends on whether a Russian
government that can't conduct honest auctions of major companies can
nonetheless run these companies better than their current owners.  That is a
tough choice between two bad owners.  Moreover, reprivatization auctions
make sense only if they will be more honest than the initial privatization.  In
Russia today, there is not yet a basis for those beliefs.
Renationalization has costs.  It can cause bad owners to accelerate the
plundering of the enterprises that they control.  If it extends beyond clear cases
of theft, it can lead managers who might otherwise manage firms with at least
one eye toward long-term value to plunder instead.  But if limited to clear cases
of theft (of which Russia has no shortage), and if accompanied by criminal
prosecution of the crooks, renationalization can also convey an important
message to managers about the limits of acceptable behavior and the long-term
risk from plundering.  In the end, the appropriate deterrent to theft cannot be to
turn a blind eye to all crooks, for fear that prosecuting some will cause others
to steal faster before their turn comes.
C.  Strengthening Product Market Discipline
Competition and trade policy are essential accompaniments to privatization.
The more competitive the market, the greater the pressure to improve
operational efficiency, the fewer the rents to be skimmed, and the shorter the
time period for which skimming can be sustained.122  Discussion of Russia's
competition and trade policies is beyond the scope of this article, but Russia has
a long way to go.  The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
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rates Russia as 2+ on a 1-5 scale for competition policy.123  And Russia's trade
policy has been moving in the wrong direction—toward higher customs duties
and tighter restrictions on oil exports.
Competition policy should make it easy for new firms to challenge existing
monopolists; trade policy should make it possible for imports to challenge
domestic  products.  The state monopoly over distribution that still exists in much
of Russia is especially pernicious, because it blocks competition across a whole
range of industries.  Just as it helps to install controls on self-dealing by
controllers of large firms before or at least together with privatization, lest
private firm owners defeat subsequent efforts to install these controls; so too
with competition and trade policy, lest private firm owners defeat efforts to
reduce their monopoly rents.
D.  How Can the Outside World Help Russia?
What the world outside Russia can do now to help isn’t clear.  Decades of
foreign aid to corrupt governments show that shoveling money at them doesn’t
help economic  development, and might hurt by financing the society’s corrupt
elements and imposing a repayment burden (since most aid is in the form of
loans).124  IMF aid was supposed to buy time for Russia to reform its tax system
so it could collect the revenues it needed to balance its budget; instead, aid
permitted the existing system to survive a bit longer, by substituting for revenues
that the government didn’t collect, while its tax reform promises went unkept.
Most of the proceeds were apparently siphoned off by kleptocrats and
government officials, leaving Russia to choose between the burden of
repayment and official default (Russia has thus far mostly chosen the latter).
It might help to promise aid that is conditioned on promises being kept, not
merely made.  A government that first adopted simple, enforceable tax rules,
put a respectable number of corrupt officials in jail, and solved a few of the
many murders of politicians and businessmen might be worth trusting to use aid
funds to support development or to assist the losers from the switch to a market
economy.  In the interim, useful steps are scarce and the payoff will be
measured in decades.  Here are a few modest ideas.
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Efforts to support legal reform are worthwhile.  Good laws on the books are
a background condition that will become important when and if an honest
government emerges.  Aid that helps Russia to develop enforcement capacity
could be highly useful.  For example, judges and prosecutors need training to
handle complex corporate cases, and the Securities Commission needs all the
enforcement resources it can get.  Training won't help when prosecutors are
called off by politicians, but not every corporate crook has as much political
clout as the first-tier kleptocrats.
I t could help to fund smart young Russians to study law, business, and
accounting in Western countries.  Many would stay (benefitting their new home
country but not Russia), but some would return, and more would return in a
decade or two, by then highly skilled, if opportunities improve.  The return of
foreign-trained professionals has aided development of other countries, including
China, Taiwan, India, and Ireland.  It could help Russia too.
A small example: Funding 500 top Russian law students to get Western legal
training (in the U.S. and Europe) would cost perhaps $20,000,000 per year
initially, and less over time if students who took law firm jobs (as most will) had
to repay their tuition loans.  Many of these lawyers would return to Russia,
either immediately or if business conditions improve.  In twenty years, Russia
would have a pool of 10,000 well-trained lawyers who understand how market-
supporting laws work.  Some would become bar leaders, law teachers, senior
government officials or political leaders who could help to bring such a system
about.
An equally long-run project would be to develop new private Russian law
and business schools.  Russia's current law schools are far too small to meet its
need for business lawyers and are often dominated by Communist-era
holdovers.  Business schools scarcely exist—the Soviet Union didn't need them.
Foreign pressure aimed at opening Russia's markets to competition could be
useful, because strong product market competition can police much self-dealing.
But the advice to open markets to imports and foreign investment must be
coupled with the advisors' willingness to open their own markets to Russian
exports—willingness that has sometimes been absent.
VII.  CONCLUSION
A central economic  lesson of the 20th century is the huge difference
between well-run, mostly market-centered economies and badly-run, often
government-centered economies.  That experience demonstrates the boost that
good government can give to economic performance, and the difficulty of
escaping from a legacy of bad government.  
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A central lesson from the past decade is that mass privatization offers no
escape from that general lesson.  A sufficiently weak government can’t build
the infrastructure that is needed to control self-dealing and support a complex
market economy.  Yet without that infrastructure, rapid large-firm privatization
won’t help the economy much if at all.  Initial conditions matter more,
institutions matter more, and privatization matters much less, than we though in
the early 1990s.
In the artificial world of the Coase Theorem, the manner of privatization
wouldn’t matter much.  Bad initial owners would quickly sell enterprises to good
owners, who would build long-term value.  In the real world, bad initial owners
loot enterprises instead and corrupt the government while they’re at it.  Call it
the triumph of Hayek over Coase—of Hayekian respect for endogenously
developed traditions over the abstract promise of Coase-influenced mass
privatization schemes.125
More generally, mass privatization was part of the shock therapists’ effort
to destroy the existing structure of state control, quickly and irrevocably.  In the
political sphere, as Edmund Burke taught us two centuries ago, destructive
revolutions often come to bad ends.126  That lesson has been relearned many
times since (not least in Russia under the Communists). Economic revolutions
that destroy existing institutions before new ones can be built are similarly likely
to founder, as those without scruples take advantage of the resulting institutional
vacuum.
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